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EDITORIAL
Economic activity in the euro area has 
decelerated, from the very buoyant pace 
registered in the first half of the year to 0.5% in 
the third quarter. Nevertheless, growth 
prospects remain robust. Growth is being 
driven primarily by domestic demand, 
suggesting that the expansion has become self-
sustained. The recovery in consumption now 
seems firmly established, as a strengthening 
labour market and improving consumer 
confidence buttress household spending. 
Investment spending also continues to perform 
strongly and business confidence indicators 
remain upbeat, suggesting a healthy corporate 
sector. 
In line with these developments, our assessment 
of the short-term outlook is sanguine. The 
European Commission's autumn 2006 forecast 
projects GDP to increase by 0.6% in the last 
quarter of 2006 and to average 2.6% for the 
year as a whole. Looking further ahead, some 
deceleration in growth is expected for 2007, 
reflecting the temporary effects of the VAT 
increase in Germany, the recent depreciation of 
the dollar and an easing in global demand, 
stemming mainly from the US. Nevertheless, 
the underlying strong momentum of the euro-
area economy should allow it to withstand these 
negative influences. Growth is therefore still 
projected to be around its potential rate in 2007.  
While slower growth in the US will undoubtedly 
have an impact on the rest of the world through 
various channels (trade, financial markets and 
confidence effects), our analysis suggests that its 
effect on activity in the euro area should be 
limited. While the economies of the euro area 
and the US frequently moved in tandem in the 
past, this was primarily a reflection of the 
occurrence of common shocks rather than of 
spillover effects from the US to the euro area. 
Today, the US faces a slowdown that is 
attributable to domestic factors rather than 
common shocks. What is more, the US 
slowdown is projected to be moderate and will 
pave the way for a much needed orderly 
unwinding of global imbalances.  
On this side of the Atlantic, the improvement 
in the euro-area economy is not purely cyclical. 
Sustained employment growth and falling 
structural unemployment are evidence that 
fundamental structural changes are also at play. 
For instance, according to estimates of the 
NAWRU (Non-Accelerating Wage Rate of 
Unemployment) presented in this report, 
structural unemployment has decreased by close 
to 1.5 percentage points in the euro area since 
the late 1990s. This shows that past structural 
reforms have begun to pay off. Further 
progress is clearly needed, but we are heading in 
the right direction. The Annual Progress Report 
recently released by the Commission shows that 
the renewed Lisbon Strategy is working and 
that Member States have made a promising start 
with the implementation of their National 
Reform Programmes.  
The increased dispersion of current account 
positions within the euro area has attracted 
analysts' attention recently. Since the late 1990s, 
current account deficits have deteriorated 
remarkably in Member States such as Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, while Member States such 
as Finland, Germany and the Netherlands have 
built up increasingly large surpluses. In some 
euro-area Member States, the accumulation of 
external deficits has led to a deterioration of net 
external asset positions that appears unmatched 
in the rest of the OECD.  
Should we worry about these developments or, 
given that exchange-rate gyrations are no longer 
possible for individual Member States, opt for 
benign neglect? The conclusions of the analysis 
presented in this report are mixed.  
The widening dispersion may partly be seen as a 
beneficial effect of the euro and European 
financial integration. In some Member States, 
the rise in current account deficits has been 
partly driven by a financial-deepening process 
that has allowed Member States with large 
financing needs to better tap international 
capital markets.  
However, widening current account differences 
also reflect some imbalances within the euro 
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area, and can be partly ascribed to a series of 
less favourable factors, including budgetary 
policy slippages in some Member States and 
large and persistent disparities in 
competitiveness developments across Member 
States. In this sense, they also reveal the 
difficulties faced by some Member States in 
properly integrating the constraints imposed by 
a single currency, particularly in terms of wage 
behaviour. Furthermore, it is worth noting that 
Member States with large deficits have tended 
to channel inflows of foreign capital to private 
consumption and housing investment rather 
than to corporate investment. This may mean 
that only limited use has been made of foreign 
debt to boost productive capacity.  
Although the immediate risks related to the 
funding of high external deficits appear 
negligible in EMU, the pace of accumulation of 
external debt in some Member States is clearly 
not sustainable in the long run. Under EMU, 
countries can finance their deficits more easily 
and for longer periods of time but not 
indefinitely. However, the transition to more 
sustainable current account positions will not be 
easy. It will require a marked improvement in 
the competitiveness of the countries concerned 
that, in the absence of nominal exchange-rate 
realignments, will necessitate a protracted 
period of wage moderation and/or efforts to 
enhance productivity. National economic 
policies geared at promoting wage flexibility, 
wage moderation and productivity gains could 
considerably facilitate the adjustment process. 
An issue that has become a source of 
considerable concern among analysts and policy 
makers is population ageing. In the coming 
decades, the euro area's population will undergo 
dramatic demographic changes due to low 
fertility rates, continuous increases in life 
expectancy and the retirement of the baby-
boom generation. This will pose major 
economic, budgetary and social challenges for 
the euro area as well as for the rest of the EU.  
Against this background, this report presents an 
assessment of the long-term sustainability of 
budgetary policies in the euro area. The analysis 
reveals that, based on current policies, a 
considerable gap exists between the current 
budgetary position and a sustainable one, a gap 
which is estimated at about 3½% of GDP. 
Hence, in the absence of reform measures and 
budgetary consolidation, government debt in 
the euro area could increase from some 70% of 
GDP today to nearly 200% of GDP by 2050. 
This is a major concern for all the euro-area 
Member States, though the relative scale of the 
challenge differs significantly across countries.  
Ensuring fiscal sustainability in the euro area 
requires time-consistent policies, which involves 
correcting budgetary imbalances before the 
budgetary impact of ageing sets in. A 
comprehensive approach is necessary, 
consisting of fiscal consolidation, efforts to 
increase employment and enhance productivity, 
and structural reforms that prepare the euro 
area's social models to meet tomorrow’s 
challenges. Several Member States have made 
progress along these three routes, by resolutely 
implementing often strenuous policy measures. 
Evidence has shown that reforms and 
ambitious fiscal policies pay off. However, 
more needs to be done, and be done soon: 
postponing the inevitable policy choices will not 
make them easier, but more difficult in the 
future. 
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I. Economic situation in the euro area 
The latest reading of the national accounts for the euro area showed slower, albeit continuously solid, growth in the third 
quarter, confirming that the recovery is broadly based and sustainable. Growth was driven primarily by domestic demand and 
in particular by household consumption, which was underpinned by robust job creation and high consumer confidence. 
Business confidence indicators have been upbeat, suggesting a healthy corporate sector. All these developments are consistent 
with a sustained expansion in the fourth quarter. Looking further ahead, some deceleration in growth is expected in 2007, 
reflecting temporary effects of the VAT increase in Germany and a certain easing in global demand, stemming mainly from 
the US. According to the European Commission's autumn 2006 forecast, GDP growth is projected to stay around potential 
in 2007.  
The long-anticipated US slowdown is now clearly under way. The US and euro-area economies are interlinked through 
various channels (in particular through trade, financial markets and confidence effects) and their business cycles show 
considerable co-movement. Moreover, there is evidence that the US business cycle leads the euro-area cycle, which could suggest 
a transmission of US shocks to the euro area. However, the historical pattern partly reflects the occurrence of common shocks, 
such as past oil price hikes and the bursting of the asset price bubble. Therefore, it is not, a priori, clear whether the current 
slowdown in the US, which is domestically generated, will affect the euro-area economy in the same way and to a similar 
extent as in the past. Moreover, the euro area is now in a significantly better position to withstand a US slowdown. 
The level of structural unemployment as measured by the non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU) has been 
on a declining trend since 1997 for the euro area as a whole. From a peak of 9.2% of the labour force in 1997, the 
NAWRU decreased by 1.4 percentage point to 7.8% in 2006 and projections point to a further decrease in 2007 and 
2008. However, the decline is uneven across Member States, reflecting the varying intensity of national policies to tackle 
structural unemployment. According to estimates of the relationship between unemployment and wage inflation, a decrease of 
the unemployment gap of one percentage point pushes up wages by 0.7 percentage point in the euro area as a whole. 
1. Recent economic developments and 
short-term prospects1  
Growth levelled off in the third quarter, but 
remains robust 
Euro-area GDP growth in the third quarter 
slowed down to 0.5% (quarter-on-quarter), i.e. 
0.1 percentage point lower than projected in the 
European Commission's autumn 2006 forecast. 
This followed strong growth in the first half of 
the year, which was revised upwards by Eurostat, 
with GDP growth for the second quarter now 
estimated at 1% instead of 0.9%. As a 
consequence, the average annualised growth rate 
for the first three quarters of 2006 was 2.6% and 
the carryover for annual GDP growth in 2006 
was revised upward to 2.5%. The underlying 
growth momentum, as measured by the year-on-
year growth rate, marginally edged down from 
2.8% in the second quarter to 2.7% in the third 
quarter.  
                                                     
1  The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue 
was 7 December 2006. 
The third-quarter growth in the euro area was 
largely influenced by the sharp deceleration in 
France, with growth falling from 1.2% in the 
second quarter to zero in the third quarter.2 
Growth in Italy also weakened in the third 
quarter (0.3%). Conversely, GDP growth 
remained strong in Spain (0.9%) and healthy in 
Germany and the Netherlands (0.6%).  
Domestic demand remains the main engine 
of growth 
Though slower growth was observed in the third 
quarter, a much brighter picture emerges when 
looking at the different GDP components. 
Indeed, growth in the third quarter continued to 
be fuelled primarily by domestic demand, which 
contributed 0.7 percentage points to growth in 
the third quarter. The slower GDP growth in the 
third quarter can be mainly attributed to external 
demand, which was a drag on growth, and to 
                                                     
2  The stagnation of France's GDP follows the very strong 
growth in the second quarter (1.2%), which was probably 
overstated due to working day adjustment problems.  
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inventory developments, which were neutral 
(Graph 1).  
Graph 1: Contributions to real GDP growth, euro area 
(quarter-on-quarter % point contributions) 
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Source: Commission services. 
After a disappointing reading in the second 
quarter (0.3%), private consumption growth 
rebounded to 0.6% in the third quarter, 
becoming the main driver of growth. The 
volatility in consumption was mainly caused by 
developments in Germany, where private 
consumption rebounded by 0.7% in the third 
quarter after a contraction of 0.2% in the second 
quarter. The consumption increase was recorded 
across all euro-area countries. It is now 
increasingly clear that consumer spending has 
been gaining momentum this year after a sluggish 
performance in previous years.  
The growth of household borrowing, though still 
at very high rates, has shown some deceleration 
in the third quarter compared to the second one. 
Available data for October show a deceleration 
in both lending for house purchase and 
consumer credit. Past withdrawal of monetary 
stimulus by the ECB seems to be weighing on 
mortgage borrowing and consumer credit. This 
signals a normalisation of monetary conditions in 
the euro area after a period of strong credit 
growth.  
Despite the deceleration in household borrowing, 
the improvement in household consumption is 
expected to continue, mirroring mainly the 
improved performance in the labour market. 
Employment growth accelerated to 0.4% 
(quarter-on-quarter) in the second quarter. At the 
same time, unemployment continued its 
downward trend. In October, unemployment 
decreased to 7.7% of the labour force. This is the 
lowest rate since the start of the Eurostat series 
in 1993. The drop was driven by significant 
improvements in Germany and France. 
According to the European Commission's 
business and consumer survey, employment 
expectations in the manufacturing and service 
sectors improved further in November. In line 
with these developments, consumer confidence 
picked up again in November and households' 
unemployment expectations were more 
optimistic (Graph 2).  
Graph 2: Consumer confidence, euro area 
(balance in % – Jan 2000 to Nov 2006) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Though decelerating from the remarkable 2.3% 
increase in the previous quarter, gross fixed 
capital formation continued to grow at a 
sustained pace in the third quarter (0.8%). The 
strong deceleration of gross fixed capital can 
mainly be attributed to developments in German 
investments. After an exceptional 4.4% increase 
in the second quarter, investment slowed down 
to 0.8% in the third quarter. Given the strong 
volatility of quarterly data, figures for the third 
quarter should be analysed in conjunction with 
those for the second quarter.  
The breakdown of investment spending by 
sector is not yet available for the third quarter. 
But available data for the second quarter showed 
that the contributions of construction and 
equipment investment in the euro area were 
comparable; both increased strongly compared to 
the previous quarter (2.2% and 2.1% 
respectively). For the construction sector, this 
was the highest rate in almost ten years.  
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The continued investment dynamism was 
reflected in loan developments in the corporate 
sector. Loans to the non-financial corporate 
sector continued to grow very strongly, reaching 
annual rates above 12% in the third quarter. In 
October, corporate loans were particularly 
impressive, reaching 12.9%, the highest rate seen 
since the early 1990s. The ECB's October 2006 
Bank Lending Survey suggests that financing 
needs are strongly related to the strengthening of 
economic activity. In particular, the need to 
increase fixed capital investments and working 
capital has become the main driver of corporate 
loan demands. It is also particularly interesting to 
note that, for the first time since the survey 
began (April 2003), the growth rate of corporate 
loans for capital spending has now exceeded that 
for M&A and debt restructuring.  
These developments seem to suggest that 
liquidity conditions continue to be favourable 
and support the ongoing corporate expansion. 
Looking ahead, a solid pace of investment 
growth should be maintained in the coming 
quarters. This follows from improved balance 
sheets, benign financial conditions, steady 
increases in capacity utilisation and solid output. 
According to the European Commission's 
business survey, capacity utilisation rose to 
83.9% between July and October, the highest 
rate since the year 2000. Higher profit margins 
also encourage ongoing corporate expansion and 
are supported by the continued pick-up in 
activity and still fairly moderate wage 
developments. Moreover, recent developments in 
labour productivity in the euro area have 
surprised on the upside. Annual labour 
productivity averaged 2% in the first half of 
2006, compared with an average rate of 0.7% 
during the past decade. It is hard to tell, at this 
juncture, how much of this productivity pick-up 
reflects a genuine structural improvement. 
However, the analysis in Box 1 suggests that the 
downward trend of labour productivity appears 
to have halted towards the end of 2002 and to 
have reversed since.  
Trade has remained unexpectedly robust 
While growth in euro-area exports decelerated 
sharply in the second quarter, it rebounded in the 
third quarter (1.7%), thereby defying 
expectations of a further deceleration in 
conjunction with the US slowdown. This can be 
explained by different factors.  
Firstly, so far, spillover effects from the 
decelerating housing market in the US to the rest 
of the US economy seem to be limited.3 For 
instance, the US Quarterly National Accounts 
show a 2.3% (quarter-on-quarter) increase in 
imports of goods in the third quarter.  
                                                     
3  See Section I.2 for a discussion on the impact of the US 
slowdown on the euro-area economy. 
Table 1: Euro-area economic growth components 
Forecast (1) 
 2005 Q4 
2006 
Q1 
2006 
Q2 
2006 
Q3 
Carryover 
to 2006 2006 (2) 2007 (2) 
 Percentage  change on previous period, volumes 
GDP 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.5 2.5 2.6 2.1 
Private consumption 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.6 1.8 2.0 1.6 
Government consumption 0.4 0.9 0.1 0.8 2.1 2.0 1.4 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.6 1.0 2.3 0.8 4.6 4.3 3.0 
Changes in inventories (% of GDP) 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 
Exports of goods and services 0.7 3.8 1.1 1.7 8.0 7.9 6.0 
Imports of goods and services 1.6 2.8 1.1 2.1 7.9 7.5 5.7 
 Percentage point contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.4 1.0 1.1 0.9 
Government consumption 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.3 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.2 1.0 0.9 0.6 
Changes in inventories 0.4 -0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 
Net exports -0.3 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 
(1) Annual change in %.         (2) European Commission Autumn 2006 Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Secondly, according to the latest estimates of the 
CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy 
Analysis, world trade growth has not decelerated. 
Rather, it seems to have stabilised, increasing by 
2.5% or more (quarter-on-quarter) since the last 
quarter of 2005.4  
Thirdly, euro-area exports to the US have been 
declining since 1999. Today, the share of euro-
area exports to the US is 15% for goods and 20% 
for services compared with, respectively, 17% 
and 23.5% in 1999.  
The prospects for euro-area exports are thus 
fairly bright. According to the European 
Commission's business surveys, the assessment 
of current export-order books improved in 
November while export-volume expectations in 
the manufacturing industry remained constant in 
the fourth quarter, albeit at a very high level.  
Euro-area imports also rebounded in the third 
quarter (2.1%), reflecting robust domestic 
demand in the euro area. The strong inflow of 
imports offset export growth, resulting in a 
slightly negative contribution of net trade. 
However, the picture is rather different across 
                                                     
4  Except in the second quarter of 2006 when world trade 
increased only by 1.3%. This was mainly the result of the 
1.8% decrease in April compared to March, which was 
partly due to working-day effects.  
Member States. For example, in France, net trade 
continued to contribute negatively to growth      
(-0.2%) while in Germany net trade contributed 
strongly (0.4%) to quarter-on-quarter growth.  
Business surveys reaching record high levels 
Business confidence indicators in general are 
remarkably high. Since mid-2005, they have 
increased sharply and reached record heights 
lately. In November, the European 
Commission's Business Climate Indicator 
continued to increase, reaching the highest level 
ever (Graph 3). These results were fully in line 
with other surveys.  
The German Ifo index also rose further in 
November, reaching much higher than expected 
levels. The index measuring current economic 
conditions hit its highest level since German re-
unification. Business expectations also increased, 
seemingly unaffected by the forthcoming VAT 
increase on 1 January 2007. The Belgian 
manufacturing index also rebounded in 
November, remaining quite high, well above the 
long-term average. Managers' production 
expectations for the months ahead continued to 
increase. The French INSEE business indicator 
remained steady, staying close to the five-year 
highs reached earlier this year (in March). The 
Table 2: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2005-2006 
 SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI Man.4) PMI Ser 5) IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8)
Long-term average 101.2 -0.00 2.77 52.5 54.7 96.5   -8.2 29.6 
Trough in latest 
downturn 88.1 -1.25 -0.77 42.9 46.7 87.3 -26.5 -10.4 
November 2005 100.2 0.10 3.4        52.8         55.2  98.4 -5.6 38.7 
December 2005 101.1 0.30 3.6        53.6         56.8  100.4 -0.8 61.6 
January 2006 101.8 0.30 3.9        53.5         57.0  103.9 -4.4 71.0 
February 2006 103.2 0.60 4.4        54.5         58.2  104.8 1.6 69.8 
March 2006 104.0 0.80 4.4        56.1         58.2  105.6 0.3 63.4 
April 2006 106.4 1.10 4.8        56.7         58.3  105.4 6.4 62.7 
May 2006 107.4 1.00 4.9        57.0         58.7  103.9 1.4 50.0 
June 2006  107.8  1.40 4.4 57.7      60.7 104.1 10.6 37.8 
July 2006 108.6 1.30 3.6 57.4 57.9 102.6 5.6 15.1 
August 2006 108.5 1.20 3.2 56.6 57.4 101.4 3.3 -5.6 
September 2006 109.3 1.40 2.7 56.6 56.7 98.9 5.0 -22.2 
October 2006 110.4 1.40  57.0 56.5 99.2 2.4 -27.4 
November 2006 110.3 1.50         56.6 57.6 100.1 4.1 -28.5 
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator, six monthly 
change. 4) Reuters Purchasing Managers Index, manufacturing. 5)  Reuters Purchasing Manager Index, services. 6) Business expectations, 
West Germany. 7)  National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) Business expectations of financial market analysts, Germany. 
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euro-area manufacturing PMI also rose further in 
October. This was particularly encouraging in the 
light of declines in the US, Japanese, Chinese, 
and UK PMI. However, at odds with most 
national surveys, the euro-area PMI decreased in 
November, dragged down by Italy.   
Graph 3: Business confidence indicators, euro area 
(Balance in % – Jan 2000 – Nov 2006) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The business surveys message is thus very clear: 
confidence remains high in the euro area. This is 
consistent with recent robust growth, which 
should remain strong or even accelerate in the 
fourth quarter.  
In spite of these strong results, industrial 
production was down by 1% in September, after 
the strong 1.7% increase in August. However, it 
is important to keep in mind the quite substantial 
volatility in monthly data. In any case, on a 
quarterly basis, euro-area industrial production 
growth showed some stabilisation. It increased 
by about 1% in the third quarter compared to the 
1.2% increase in the second quarter. In this 
context and as long as business confidence 
remains high, fluctuations in monthly production 
are not unduly worrying. 
Various factors explain the recent business 
optimism: (i) robust domestic demand in the 
euro area; (ii) declining oil prices; (iii) ongoing 
gains in the stock market; (iv) improved balance 
sheets; (v) benign financial conditions and; 
(vi) higher profit margins. Most of these factors 
should continue supporting business confidence 
in the coming months.  
The service sector surveys also point to a solid 
pace of economic activity. After four months of 
consecutive fall, the services PMI rebounded 
strongly in November. The European 
Commission's Survey indicator, though slightly 
decreasing in November, still remains well above 
its long-term average (Graph 3).  
Short-term outlook and risks 
After the slight moderation in growth in the third 
quarter, business surveys clearly point to either a 
stabilisation at a high level in the fourth quarter, 
or to some acceleration.  
The European Commission's autumn 2006 
forecast projected growth to reach 0.6% in the 
last quarter of 2006. For 2006, GDP growth is 
expected to reach 2.6%. Looking ahead, some 
deceleration in growth is expected for 2007, 
reflecting a certain easing in global growth and, 
in particular, in US growth. Nevertheless, the 
outlook is still for robust euro-area growth at 
around potential (2.1% for 2007), driven 
primarily by domestic demand.  
Overall, the risks to the outlook are fairly 
balanced. On the domestic side, on the one hand, 
the VAT increase in Germany will have 
temporary adverse effects on consumer 
consumption. On the other hand, the labour 
market performance in the euro area could 
improve more than expected, boosting consumer 
consumption.  
Risks stemming from the international side 
include developments in oil prices. Fundamentals 
suggest that they could fall further. However, it 
cannot be ruled out that oil prices may increase 
again due to geopolitical tensions. A disorderly 
correction of global imbalances also remains one 
of the main downside risks. Finally, a sharper-
than-expected US slowdown could have a 
negative impact on the euro area. 
Nevertheless, the confirmation of domestic 
demand as the main engine of growth, as well as 
the good health of the corporate sector, should 
help the euro area to maintain robust growth. 
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Box 1: Are we witnessing a structural improvement in labour productivity? 
 
As a key determinant of long-run economic growth, productivity constitutes a core economic indicator. There are 
two generally accepted measures of productivity: labour productivity and total factor productivity. Whereas labour 
productivity measures economic output per unit of labour, total factor productivity relates output to the combined 
usage of factor inputs, namely, labour and capital. In a standard decomposition of a production function, there is a 
clear relationship between the two concepts in that changes in labour productivity are composed of capital input, 
labour input and total factor productivity. The concept of labour productivity is of significant policy relevance, as a 
driving force of competitiveness, living standards and potential output.  
 
Recent developments in labour productivity growth 
Recent developments in labour productivity in the euro area have surprised on the upside. Labour productivity in the 
euro area averaged 2% (annualised) in the first half of 2006, compared with an annual average rate of 0.7% during 
the past decade. However, as the acceleration of labour productivity is fairly recent, a pick-up of the long-term trend 
is difficult to disentangle from the current cyclical upswing.  
 
The acceleration in labour productivity between the second half of 2005 and the first half of 2006 appears to be 
broadly based across sectors, even though labour productivity growth in the labour-intensive market services sectors 
and construction sectors was slower than in the more capital-intensive industrial sectors. Specifically, labour 
productivity (measured in terms of value added per person) in the private business sector (i.e. the whole economy 
excluding agriculture and public administration) expanded at an annualised pace of 2.6% in the first half of 2006, up 
from 0.8% in the previous six months, which equals the average growth rates observed in the decade 1995-2005. 
Within the private business sector, labour productivity growth strengthened in industry, largely reflecting a capital 
deepening. Across the larger Member States, productivity gains have been particularly large in the first half of 2006 in 
Germany. This surge is reflected in the sharp increase in labour productivity in industry, which more than doubled 
the average growth rate observed in the past decade. The private services sector has also performed remarkably well 
in Germany. Labour productivity gains have been significant in France and Spain, although more moderate than in 
Germany as far as the private business sector as a whole is concerned. Spain appears to be reducing the gap in the 
services sector. The picture is less rosy in Italy. Long-term labour productivity growth has been fairly low in Italy 
over the last ten years across the main sectors of the economy and recent developments appear to be at odds with 
the rest of the euro area. In the case of both Spain and Italy however, figures are partly distorted to the downside due 
to the regularisation of immigrants. 
 
Labour productivity growth (1), euro area 
(annual change in %.) 
 1995-2005 (2) 
2005H2 
(3) 
2006H1 
(3) 
Whole economy 0.7 0.7 2.0 
Private business sector, of 
which 0.8 0.8 2.6 
Private services sector 0.2 -0.3 1.6 
Public administration 0.0 -0.1 0.2 
Breakdown of private business sector into main branches: 
Industry 
(excl. construction) 2.3 3.6 5.6 
Construction -1.0 1.1 1.0 
Trade & transport 0.8 1.4 2.2 
Finance and business -1.1 -2.5 0.8 
(1) Measured in terms of value added per person. 
(2) Average y-o-y growth rates.  
(3) Annualised semester-on-semester growth rates. 
Source: Commission services.  
Labour productivity growth, larger Member 
States (annual change in %.) 
 1995-2005 (1) 2006H1(2)
DE Private business sector 1.6 4.6 
of which: 
- Industry (excl. construction) 3.0 6.5 
- Private services sector 0.8 3.4 
FR Private business sector 1.4 2.5 
of which:  
- Industry (excl. construction) 4.0 8.0 
- Private services sector 0.7 1.2 
IT Private business sector 0.3 -0.5 
of which: 
- Industry (excl. construction) 0.4 -0.1 
- Private services sector 0.0 -1.1 
ES Private business sector -0.7 1.5 
of which:  
- Industry (excl. construction) 0.3 2.9 
- Private services sector -0.9 1.3 
(1) Average y-o-y growth rates. 
(2) Annualised semester-on-semester growth rates. 
Source: Commission services.  
 
Assessing the structural component of labour productivity growth 
Productivity growth is partly a cyclical phenomenon. Productivity changes are known to be pro-cyclical, picking up 
strongly in the early stages of an economic upturn and tending to weaken in a downturn. This reflects the lagged 
response of employment to output changes. Yet labour productivity growth is also subject to long-run dynamics and 
the long-run dimension is typically captured by trend patterns. Ten-year averages show labour productivity growth in 
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the euro area to have been on a declining trend during the last fifty years. The main factors behind this long-term 
decline are low capital accumulation and deteriorating total factor productivity growth. According to several recent 
studies, from a sectoral perspective, industries that neither produce nor use ICT appear most responsible for the 
decline in average labour productivity growth since the mid-1990s.*  
 
Actual and trend labour productivity growth,  
euro area (private business sector) (in%) 
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In order to analyse the latest labour productivity 
developments, the trend was extracted from a 
quarterly sample. The downward trend of labour 
productivity growth in the private business sector 
appears to have halted towards the end of 2002 and 
to have been reversed since then. Trend labour 
productivity growth bottomed out at 0.5% (year-on-
year) in 2002Q4 accelerating to 0.8% in 2006Q2. 
One drawback of measuring labour productivity per 
person is that it is affected by the declining trend in 
the number of average hours worked per person. 
However, as shown in the chart, correcting for the 
trend in hours worked seems to make little 
difference other than a level shift in the overall trend 
of labour productivity. A similar rising trend in 
labour productivity is visible in most sectors of the 
economy (see table below). This is particularly the 
case for the private services sector. Labour 
productivity growth in this sector started declining in 
the early nineties, to bottom out in the last quarter of 
2001. Since then, however, it has accelerated to stand 
at 0.4% in the second quarter of 2006. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Trend labour productivity growth by sector, euro area (1) 
(y-o-y growth rates in %) 
 at latest trough (2) 2006Q2 
Whole economy 0.5 (2002Q4) 0.8 
Private business sector, of which 0.5 (2002Q4) 0.8 
Private services sector -0.1 (2001Q4) 0.4 
Breakdown of private business sector in main branches: 
Industry (excl. construction) 1.9 (2002Q1) 3.1 
Trade and transport 0.5 (2003Q2) 1.0 
Finance and business -1.8 (1999Q3) -0.5 
(1) Trend extracted using a Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
(2) Latest trough within brackets. 
Source: Commission services.  
 
Overall, the acceleration in productivity gains in the services sector since 2002 is higher than the improvement 
observed for the euro area as a whole, highlighting the role of the services sector as the key driver of the labour 
productivity surge. It is worth noting that the contribution of the services sector to the acceleration of overall labour 
productivity growth since 2002 is now as large as that of industry. Looking at labour productivity developments in 
other sectors of the economy (manufacturing, trade and transport, finance and business), the overall picture of an 
interruption in the declining trend of the nineties and the subsequent reversal remains valid.  
 
(*) European Commission (2006), 'Long-term labour productivity and GDP projections for the EU25 Member states: a 
production function framework', European Economy, Economic Papers, No 253/2006 
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Monetary and financial conditions  
On 7 December, the ECB continued its 
normalisation of interest rates when it hiked its 
policy rates for the sixth time since December 
2005. The ECB's key policy rate currently stands 
at 3.5 percent. The interest rate increases were 
motivated by upside risks to price stability over 
the medium term, as identified by the ECB's 
analysis, both economic and monetary. It should 
help ensure that medium- to longer-term 
inflation expectations in the euro area remain 
solidly anchored at levels consistent with price 
stability.  
Although interest rates are still at relatively low 
levels, the policy rate hikes combined with an 
exchange-rate appreciation have led to some 
further tightening of monetary conditions in the 
euro area as measured by a Monetary Conditions 
Index (MCI). 
Graph 4: Euro-area MCI and its contributors 
(index Jan 1999=100 – Inverted scale – Jan 99 to Oct 06) 
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Source: Commission services. 
After a weakening of the euro exchange rate at 
the beginning of the fourth quarter 2006, the 
euro has been on an appreciating trend since 
mid-October. Between 16 October and 
8 December, the euro gained some 6% against 
the US dollar and about 2.5% against the 
Japanese yen, though in nominal effective terms 
the appreciation was more muted. The recent 
weakening of the US dollar can be explained by 
different factors. The US is in the late stages of 
the business cycle, there is evidence suggesting a 
slowdown of productivity growth and of the 
medium-term growth potential, while the current 
account deficit remains high. At the same time, 
economic growth in the euro area has 
accelerated, and the expected interest-rate 
differential (based on futures contracts) with 
respect to the US has decreased by around 90 
basis points over the last seven months.  
 
The cyclical decoupling between the euro area 
and the US has also been reflected in 
government bond markets. Overall, 10-year 
government bond yields temporarily increased 
some 20 basis points in the course of October in 
both the US and the euro area. In November, 
bond yields remained relatively stable in the euro 
area at around 3.7% but lost some 10 basis 
points in the US where they currently stand 
slightly below 4.5%. As a result, the interest-rate 
differential at both sides of the Atlantic declined 
further to around 80 basis points over the last 
months. This could be interpreted as a sign that 
market participants are increasingly 
differentiating between the US and the euro-area 
economy. Some differentiation was already 
noticeable earlier at the short end of the yield 
curve, where the differential for 2-year 
government bonds declined from 180 basis 
points in June to currently slightly above 90 basis 
points. 
Both the euro area and the US are experiencing 
flat or flattening yield curves. Flat yield curves 
today seem to be a phenomenon common to 
Table 3: Exchange rate developments  
(in %, 8 December 2006) 
 
USD/ 
EUR 
JPY/ 
EUR 
NEER 
euro 
area (1) 
REER 
euro 
area (2) 
 Change relative to  
1 Jan. 06 12.5 10.3 4.9 1.7 
Avg 2005 7.0 12.4 2.4 -1.0 
Level compared with 1995-2005 average
 18.8 20.8 16.2 2.2 
(1) Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (reference group of 41 
countries). 
(2) Real Effective Exchange Rate  (reference group of 41 countries). 
Source: Commission services, EcoWin. 
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most industrialised countries. Nine out of ten 
selected yield curves show an absolute spread of 
less than 50 basis points between the 2-year and 
the 10-year maturity segment (swaps) (Graph 5). 
Graph 5: Flattering of the yield curve 
(10y-2y interest rate swaps spreads in bp as of  
8 December 2006) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
 
2.  Will the effects of a US slowdown spill 
over to the euro area? 
The long anticipated US slowdown is now clearly 
under way. US GDP growth decelerated to an 
annualised rate of 2.6% in the second quarter and 
to 1.6% in the third quarter. The slowdown is so 
far mainly concentrated in the housing sector. 
Home sales have fallen by 10% since the last 
quarter of 2005, while residential investment 
contracted in the third quarter at an annualised 
rate of 17.4% compared to the preceding quarter, 
the sharpest decline since the 1990-1991 
recession. In October, housing starts dropped by 
14.6% compared to September, to the lowest 
level in more than six years. Year-on-year, 
housing starts are now 27% lower while building 
permits declined for the ninth consecutive 
month.  The appreciation of house prices has 
also slowed sharply and some local markets have 
experienced price declines. However, significant 
spillover effects on other parts of the US 
economy are not yet discernible in the data. 
Consumer spending (3.2%) and business fixed 
investment (8.6%) both rebounded to post solid 
growth in the third quarter.  
At the same time, the euro-area economy is 
growing strongly. The Commission's autumn 
2006 forecast projects that this year’s economic 
growth will reach 2.6% in the euro area, i.e. more 
than 1 percentage point above last year’s. 
Domestic demand, which is the main driver, is 
set to maintain a steady pace.  
The US and euro-area economies are interlinked 
through various channels (in particular through 
trade, financial markets and confidence effects) 
and their business cycles show considerable co-
movement. There is also evidence that the US 
business cycle leads the euro-area cycle, which 
could be indicative of a transmission of US 
shocks to the euro area. A more severe downturn 
in the US economy could therefore also lead to a 
deterioration of the outlook for the euro area.  
Spillover effects through trade linkages…  
A US slowdown will directly affect the euro-area 
economy through a decline in euro-area exports 
to the US. Euro-area exports of goods (in 
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nominal USD values5) to the US, which in 2005 
were 2.3% of GDP, have increased by almost 
60% between 1999 and 2005. This rapid growth 
notwithstanding, the share of the US in euro-area 
exports of goods (excluding intra-euro-area 
trade) declined by 1½ pp. to 15½% in 2005 
(Table 4). This decline is comparable with the 
evolution for the other industrialised economies, 
reflecting, in particular, the enhanced importance 
of emerging markets in world trade. In particular, 
the recently acceded Member States (RAMS), the 
candidate countries and emerging Asia have 
become important destinations for euro-area 
exports. 
Table 4: Share of extra euro-area exports in total 
euro-area exports of goods (%)  
 1999 2001 2003 2005 
Industrialised 
non-EA 
59.1 57.2 54.8 51.6 
 DK, SE, UK 27.1 25.6 25.1 23.1 
 USA 17.1 17.6 16.3 15.4 
 Other (1) 14.9 14.0 13.4 13.0 
RAMS (2) 10.0 10.3 11.5 11.8 
Candidate 
countries (3) 3.7 3.6 4.7 5.4 
CIS (4) 2.3 3.3 3.9 4.9 
Dev. Countries 24.9 25.6 25.1 26.4 
 MENA (5) 8.0 7.9 8.0 8.5 
 Sub-Saharan         
Africa 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 
 Latin America 5.3 5.1 4.0 4.2 
 Asia 8.8 9.7 10.2 10.8 
(1) Japan, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Australia, New 
Zealand. 
(2) Recently-acceded Member States of the EU. 
(3) Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Turkey. 
(4) Commonwealth of Independent States 
(5) Middle East and North Africa 
Source: IMF. 
 
Given that the slowdown in the US is likely to 
affect consumer goods more than other goods, 
the share of consumer goods in overall goods 
exports to the US may also be important. This 
share amounts to 30% for the euro area as a 
whole. Combining the figures for the share of 
exports of goods to the US in overall goods 
exports and the share of consumer goods in 
goods exports to the US, about 5% of total euro-
area exports would be more-or-less strongly 
affected by a US downturn. 
                                                     
5 Exports by destination are only available in values. 
Available data on international trade for services 
show similar trends to those for goods. Between 
2002 and 2004, euro-area services exports 
(excluding intra-euro-area trade) shifted towards 
emerging economies. The falling share of exports 
to industrialised countries over this period is, 
however, solely due to the declining share going 
to the US, which dropped by more than 4 pp.6 
Despite this fall, the US share in total euro-area 
services exports remains above the 
corresponding share for goods exports. In terms 
of GDP, services exports to the US accounted 
for 0.9% of euro-area GDP in 2004.  
Taking goods and services exports together, 
exports to the US account for about 3% of euro-
area GDP. Assuming that a drop in US imports 
affects euro-area exports in a proportional 
manner, a 1% decline would reduce euro-area 
exports by an amount worth 0.03% of GDP.7 
However, in order to gauge the impact on euro-
area GDP itself, multiplier effects would have to 
be taken into account, including a reduction in 
import growth. 
The slowdown in the US will have not only a 
direct but also an indirect impact on euro-area 
exports. Euro-area exports to third countries will 
be affected by the impact of the US slowdown 
on those countries' economic activity, though the 
magnitude of the impact will depend on the 
extent of their trade relations with the euro area. 
It might be significant, as seen from the US trade 
shares of some industrialised trading partners of 
the euro area. For instance, the United Kingdom 
– the euro-area's largest individual export market 
(one-sixth of extra-euro-area exports) – ships 
one-seventh of its own exports to the US. 
An important question will be to what extent the 
emerging-market economies in Asia would be 
affected by a downturn in the US. The 
importance of the US as a destination for Asian 
exports remains high, albeit declining. Exports to 
the US represented about 20% of total Asian 
                                                     
6  Preliminary data suggests that the share of euro-area 
services exports to the US saw a further significant 
drop in 2005. 
7  According to econometric estimates of the link between 
euro-area exports and US import demand on the basis of 
quarterly data, the long-run elasticity of euro-area exports 
to the US with respect to a change in US imports is 0.93, 
a near-proportional effect.  
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exports in 2005, compared to 25% in 2000. Due 
to the growing Asian trade integration, the 
importance of intra-Asian exports has increased.  
However, a large part of intra-Asian trade 
consists of intermediate goods which are 
assembled in Asia before being shipped to the 
US. For this reason, intra-Asian trade is likely 
also to be affected by a US slowdown.  
…but also through financial market linkages 
and confidence effects  
The magnitude of the trade-channel effects 
depends also on how the dollar-euro exchange 
rate responds to the US slowdown. If the US 
economy were to slow down more sharply than 
expected, market expectations of changes in the 
interest differential between the US and the euro 
area might lead to a depreciation of the dollar.  
This could be reinforced should there also be an 
upward shift in the risk premium foreign 
investors require for investing in the US. 
Any depreciation of the dollar would exacerbate 
the negative effect of a US slowdown on the 
euro-area economy via direct trade effects. 
Moreover, the strength of any ensuing indirect 
trade effects would also crucially depend on the 
exchange-rate policy of Asian countries.  
However, given the euro area's strong trade links 
with other European countries, developments in 
its overall competitiveness will also very much 
depend on how those countries' currencies 
evolve.  
While lower export demand, in particular for 
consumer goods, would tend to lead to lower 
investment growth, this would be somewhat 
offset by lower interest rates due to higher US 
savings and reduced inflationary pressures. In 
fact, simulations carried out with DG ECFIN's 
Quest model suggest that the net effect of the 
slowdown on investment could even be positive, 
leading to higher GDP in euro area in the long-
run.  
Exchange-rate movements would also have 
significant direct effects through the changes in 
the valuation of euro-area holdings of US assets, 
affecting in particular corporate balance sheets.8 
                                                     
8  According to ECB statistics, at the end of 2005 the euro 
area held (gross) assets in the United States worth more 
Recent estimates suggest that the net claims in 
US dollars of the euro area amounted to 16.8% 
of GDP in 2005.9 While this is significant, it was 
found to be roughly half the exposure of Japan 
and China. 
The US slowdown may also have spillover effects 
through corporate and financial linkages other 
than the channels already considered.  The US 
activities of euro-area firms are considerable. In 
2003, sales through affiliates of euro-area 
companies amounted to 7.5% of euro-area 
GDP.10 A slowdown in the US would therefore 
have an impact in that it would make these 
activities less profitable. And there could be 
some impact on euro-area production to the 
extent that production by US affiliates affects the 
production and investment decisions of euro-
area parent companies. Furthermore, the US 
slowdown could also affect production decisions 
by US entrepreneurs in the euro area.  
Financial linkages could also lead to spillover 
effects through financial asset prices due to the 
impact of the slowdown on investor sentiment. 
Financial markets currently seem to be predicting 
a soft landing of the US economy, in line with 
the Commission's autumn 2006 forecast. A 
stronger-than-expected slowdown could 
therefore have an impact on US asset markets. 
Given the interdependence of international 
financial markets, with widespread cross-border 
holdings of assets, there could be an additional 
spillover effect on investor confidence globally. 
Currently, the degree of co-movement of stock 
prices in the US and the euro area is quite high 
(Graph 6) and an adjustment of stock market 
valuations could easily spread across major 
markets (as it did during May this year). Global 
risk premia are very low by historical standards 
and a reassessment of investors' appetite for risk 
could lead to synchronised rise in risk premia. 
However, this might be somewhat 
                                                                              
than 2.3 trillion euro (1.3 trillion euro in portfolio assets, 
0.5 trillion euro for direct investment and 0.5 trillion euro 
for other assets). 
9  Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005), 'Europe and Global 
imbalances', paper presented at the IMF's 7th Jacques 
Polak annual research conference, November 9-10, 2006. 
10  Domestic sales exclude imports from the euro-area parent 
group, as these are included in euro-area exports. 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area IV/2006 
 
 
 
- 16 - 
counterbalanced by a possible shift in relative 
risk premia in favour of euro-area assets. 
Graph 6: Correlation of euro and US equity indices 
(6 months) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Finally, there may be spillover effects on business 
and consumer confidence in general.11 
Historically, there is evidence of a correlation 
between business and consumer confidence in 
the US and the euro area over and above what 
would be expected from the impact through the 
channels that have been considered so far.12 
However, in the current context of an 
idiosyncratic slowdown in the US resulting from 
a slowdown in the housing market, such 
spillovers may be smaller than seen in the past. 
Correlation between the euro area and US 
business cycles has been high since the 
1970s… 
Since the US and euro-area economies are 
interlinked through various channels, their 
business cycles show considerable co-movement. 
Over the last 35 years, the euro-area and the US 
business cycles have posted a significant degree 
of co-movement, with a clear lead for the US 
                                                     
11  See also the discussion in the Quarterly Report on the 
Euro Area, December 2003, Vol 2, No 4, pp. 16. 
12  See Anderton et al, 'Understanding the impact of the 
external dimension on the euro area: Trade, capital flows 
and other international macroeconomic linkages', ECB 
Occasional Paper, No 12, April 2004. 
cycle (Graph 7).13 On average, the US cycle led 
the euro-area cycle by 3 quarters for a coincident 
correlation of about 47% (the correlation rises to 
67% when the euro-area cycle is lagged by 3 
quarters) (Table 5).14. However, the degree of 
synchronisation is very different depending on 
the sub-periods considered. If the sample is 
restricted to the period from 1990, the 
correlation falls to 25%.  
Graph 7: GDP business cycles, euro area and US 
(Output gap in % – 1970Q1-2006Q3) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Table 5 displays the correlations between the 
detrended euro-area and US GDP series for 
different periods. The first three periods 
correspond broadly to the last three euro-area 
cycles (1970-1985, 1986-1996 and 1997-2006). A 
strong correlation is found in the seventies as 
well as in the current cycle and hardly any 
correlation in the early nineties. This can be 
partly explained by the German unification which 
boosted euro-area growth while the US was 
falling into recession. It was only after the US 
was well on its way to recovery that the euro area 
fell into recession.  
                                                     
13  The euro-area and US business cycles were extracted from 
respectively, the euro-area and US GDP series using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
14  In the current cycle, the highest correlation is reached 
when the US cycle is lagged by 5 quarters. This is quite 
short compared with the 1986-1996 period during which 
the euro-area cycle was lagging the US cycle by more than 
two years (9 quarters) but relatively long compared to the 
1970-1985 period (2 quarters). 
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Table 5 : GDP cycles correlations, euro area and US 
  
Correlation Highest correlation 
(lag) 
1970Q1 – 1985Q4 70% 84% (2) 
1986Q1 – 1996Q4 6% 80% (9) 
1997Q1 – 2006Q4 42% 89% (5) 
1970Q1 – 2006Q4 47% 67% (3) 
1990Q1 – 2006Q4 25% 87% (7) 
2003Q1 – 2006Q4 -20% 79% (8) 
Source: Commission services. 
… but this was mainly the result of common 
shocks 
A high degree of correlation may be the 
consequence of common shocks hitting both 
regions at the same time or of a shock hitting one 
country and being transmitted rapidly to the 
other via contagion effects. The high co-
movement observed here seems to reflect mostly 
the former (i.e. common shocks) for two 
reasons.  
Firstly, if transmission through the different 
channels identified above was the main cause of 
the high correlation during the past 35 years, 
contagion effects would be found in euro-area 
investment rather than consumption. In this case, 
a higher correlation would be found between the 
euro-area and US for investment cycles than for 
consumption cycles. However, this is not the 
case and the correlation between consumption 
cycles is high.    
Second, three out of the four major slowdowns 
in the US over the last 35 years (1973, 1979 and 
2000) were clearly followed by a euro-area 
slowdown. The key common element to these 
downturns is that they were all caused by 
common shocks which hit all different parts of 
the world at the same time. These include the 
large hikes in oil prices (in 1973 and 1979) and 
the bursting of the stock market bubble (2000-
2001). These common shocks have synchronised 
not only the euro-area and US business cycles, 
but the international business cycle in general. As 
already mentioned, in the case of the US 
slowdown in the early nineties, the euro area was 
boosted by German unification.  
This begs the crucial question, why does the US 
seem to lead the euro-area economy when 
common shocks hit all parts of the world at the 
same time? The answer lies in the greater 
flexibility of its economy, which means that its 
response to shocks is markedly faster than the 
euro area's. Thus a common shock which hits 
both economies at the same time will result in a 
sharper and faster downturn in the US and also 
in an earlier and faster recovery. Therefore, the 
slower euro-area response to common shocks is 
not a sign of dependence on the US but rather a 
delayed response to shocks due to a less flexible 
economy.  
Since the high correlation between the two cycles 
in the past seems to reflect common shocks 
rather than a dependence on the US, today's US 
slowdown, which is driven by its housing sector, 
should have a limited impact on the euro area. 
This should be true unless a sharper US 
slowdown triggers strong spillovers through 
balance sheets, equity markets and confidence 
channel and through a fall in the value of the 
dollar. Box 2 describes the impact of different 
simulations of a sharper slowdown in the US on 
the euro area.  
Graph 8: Euro area and US consumption cycles  
(Gap in % – 1970Q1-2006Q3) 
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Source: Commission services. 
An encouraging picture also emerges when 
looking at the most recent period (2003-2006). 
Indeed, since 2003, there seems to be no 
correlation between the euro-area and the US 
cycles (Table 5). The pick-up in activity in the US 
since 2003 was not followed by a similar upswing 
in the euro area until mid-2005. Moreover, the 
correlation between the consumption cycle in the 
euro area and the US has come down 
significantly from the high levels reached in the  
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Box 2: A harder-landing scenario for the US economy 
This box presents the results of three QUEST II model simulations of a sharper slowdown in the US economy.  The 
baseline scenario (the softer-landing scenario) of the European Commission's autumn 2006 forecast assumes a 10% 
fall in the level of house prices and a moderate decline in residential construction until the third quarter of 2007. A 
sharper correction could see house prices coming down by 20% and residential construction following a more 
pronounced downturn similar to the one experienced in the 1990/1991 recession. In the three sharper slowdown 
scenarios presented in this box, US GDP is reduced by 2.5% in 2008 compared to the baseline projection (annual 
growth in 2007-2008 is reduced by about 1¼ pps. each year). In all three scenarios, the US slowdown is triggered by 
a cooling of the housing market and the effect this has on residential construction and private consumption.  
In the first scenario, the slowdown in US domestic demand leads to a small improvement in the US trade balance of 
½% of GDP. As to the effects on the euro area, only trade effects are assumed to be at work, with lower demand in 
the US reducing EU exports. Indirect effects via other trading partners reinforce this negative trade impact. In 
addition, the increase in US savings reduces global real interest rates, leading to a small increase in euro-area 
investment. The overall effect on euro-area GDP is a small negative spillover, reducing GDP growth by about 0.2 
pp. in 2007 and by 0.1 pp. in 2008. This scenario is relatively benign with spillover effects only coming through lower 
export demand (and partly compensated by a lower global interest rate).  
 
QUEST simulations: impact of a harder-landing scenario in the US  
(Level deviations from baseline in %) 
 Euro area US 
 GDP Investment  Consumption GDP Investment Consumption
Scenario 1: Only trade channel (both direct and indirect) 
2007 -0.2 0.3 0.0 -1.1 -4.1 -0.9 
2008 -0.3 0.6 0.0 -2.5 -5.9 -2.7 
Scenario 2: Trade channel + balance sheets, equity markets and confidence channel 
2007 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -4.1 -0.9 
2008 -0.5 0.0 -0.1 -2.5 -5.9 -2.7 
Scenario 3: Trade channel + confidence effects + financial market linkages 
2007 -0.5 0.7 0.3 -1.3 -5.4 -1.5 
2008 -0.8 1.6 0.4 -2.5 -8.2 -3.4 
Source: Commission services. 
 
A sharper slowdown in the US could, however, trigger further spillovers through the balance sheets, equity markets 
and confidence channels. Scenario 2 includes an additional negative shock to investment in the euro area which 
offsets the positive impact of lower global real interest rates on investment. Consumption and, in particular, 
investment growth would be less buoyant than in the first scenario. This would almost double the overall GDP 
effect on the euro area, reducing growth by 0.3 pp. in the first year and by 0.2 pp. in the second. 
The possibility of a fall in the value of the dollar cannot be ruled out. Scenario 3 assumes that, in addition to the 
effects underlying scenario 2, the dollar depreciates by 10% vis-à-vis the euro (risk premium shock). The scenario 
assumes further that Asian currencies maintain a peg relative to the US currency, leading to depreciation of the dollar 
of around 6% in real effective terms. The real effective appreciation for the euro area is less than 3%. As before, it is 
assumed that this accompanied by a negative confidence-related spillover effect impacting on investment in the euro 
area. The slowdown in US domestic demand and the dollar depreciation lead to a sizeable improvement in the US 
trade balance of more than 1 pp. There are several partly offsetting channels through which the euro area is affected. 
The appreciation of the euro and lower demand in the US reduces EU exports and raises imports. On the other 
hand, the appreciation lowers import prices, boosting consumption and investment spending. The increase in US 
savings also reduces global interest rates. In addition, the risk premium shock to the dollar implies a shift in 
investors' preferences, benefiting the euro, reducing interest rates and boosting domestic demand in the euro area. 
However, this is partly offset by a negative shock to investment reflecting lower confidence and stock market 
repercussions. This leads to a smaller positive effect on domestic demand in the euro area and the negative trade 
effect dominates. GDP growth is reduced by 0.5 pp. in the first year and 0.3 pp. in the second year.  
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late nineties (Graph 8).15 In addition, the 
consumption outlook for the euro area is 
increasingly optimistic with a clear improvement 
in employment growth.  
Overall assessment 
The euro-area economy will evidently be directly 
affected by a US slowdown through a decline in 
euro-area exports to the US. Furthermore, there 
will also be an indirect trade effect, depending on 
the extent to which the US growth slowdown 
will impact on third countries' economies and on 
those countries' trade relations with the euro 
area. The implications of the slowdown for euro-
area trade will also depend on possible exchange 
rate movements. The US slowdown may in 
addition have spillover effects through corporate 
and financial linkages as well as through business 
and consumer confidence.  
However, while the risks of contagion stemming 
from linkages should not be ignored, neither 
should we exaggerate them. The current 
slowdown in the US is country-specific and not 
sparked by a common adverse shock across 
world regions as was the case in previous 
downturns. Therefore, it is not, a priori, clear 
whether it will affect the euro-area economy in 
the same way and to the same extent as in the 
past. 
Moreover, the euro area is now in a better 
position than in the past to decouple from the 
US slowdown. Indeed, euro-area growth is 
anticipated to be increasingly based on domestic 
demand over the next two years. While the 
overall macro-economic policy stance is likely to 
be somewhat less accommodative than in 
previous years, financing conditions remain fairly 
favourable. Good employment growth and 
increasing profitability on the back of moderate 
wage increases, coupled with a rise in 
productivity growth, will be the main driving 
forces of domestic demand. This domestic-
demand-driven growth should help reduce the 
euro area's reliance on exports. Moreover, in 
                                                     
15  The particularly high correlation of consumption in the 
two regions from the late 1990s until 2003 reflects the 
importance of the succession of common shocks during 
this period. See 'Business cycle linkages between the euro 
area and the USA', Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, 
Vol. 2, No. 4 (2003).  
view of the diminishing share of the US in euro-
area exports, euro-area exports should not 
worsen dramatically.  
Company balance sheets have improved since 
the dot-com bubble burst. This makes companies 
less vulnerable to a worsening of financial-market 
conditions. In addition, companies in the euro 
area should be less affected via the financial-
market channel due to current stock market 
valuations, which are more in line with 
fundamentals in than they were at the height of 
the dot-com bubble. 
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3. The non-accelerating wage rate of 
unemployment (NAWRU) in the euro 
area 
When it comes to the measurement of structural 
unemployment, the non-accelerating wage rate of 
unemployment (NAWRU) has long been part of 
the analyst's toolkit for a better understanding of 
the interplay between the functioning of the 
labour market and inflationary pressures in the 
economy. This section presents the concept and 
its current modelling at DG ECFIN and outlines 
a number of observations that can be derived 
from the indicator.  
The origin of the concept 
The starting point for the reflections that would 
eventually lead to the emergence of NAWRU as 
a concept was written in 1958 by A.W. Phillips, 
who was the first to note the trade-off between 
wage inflation and unemployment in data 
covering the United Kingdom.16 He observed 
that wage inflation tends to be high when 
unemployment is low and low when 
unemployment is high. Data was found to fit well 
along a specific pattern that became to be known 
as the Phillips curve. This concept gave rise to 
policies exploiting that relationship. They 
concluded that some degree of economic 
stimulation leading to an acceleration of inflation 
could lower the unemployment rate. This 
interpretation was refuted thereafter by 
prominent economists, including E. Phelps, 2006 
Nobel prize winner, and the late M. Friedman, 
Nobel prize winner in 1976. 17 Employment gains 
brought by higher wage inflation can only be of a 
temporary nature as they are driven by the 
money illusion of workers. Persistent policy 
stimulus leads to higher inflation but labour 
market benefits disappear as the Phillips curve 
shifts upwards and is ultimately vertical over the 
long term. Ample evidence derived from the 
                                                     
16  Phillips, A.W. (1958), 'The relation between 
unemployment and the rate of change of money wage 
rates in the United Kingdom', 1861-1957, Econometrica, 25, 
pp. 283-299. 
17  Phelps, E. (1968), 'Money-Wage Dynamics and Labor-
Market Equilibrium', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 76, 
Part 2, p. 678-711 and Friedman, M. (1968), '.The role of 
monetary policy', American Economic Review', Vol. 58, pp 1-
17. 
stagflation of the seventies in industrialised 
countries came to the support of these 
objections: any short-term improvements relative 
to the NAWRU resulting from stimulatory policy 
actions were reflected in progressively higher 
rates of inflation without a durable decrease in 
unemployment. 
However, although discredited as a direct policy 
tool, the Phillips curve and its associated 
NAWRU can still provide some information to 
economists and policy-makers alike. Provided the 
NAWRU is successfully isolated, the 
unemployment rate can be broken into a cyclical 
and a structural component. The structural rate 
of unemployment (NAWRU) reveals how well 
the labour market performs in matching 
employment supply with demand, especially as 
data on vacancies, another potential indicator for 
the same purpose, has proven to be less reliable. 
For its part, the cyclical unemployment 
component reflects the effect of temporary 
macroeconomic shocks. If properly identified, 
the NAWRU can also provide evidence on 
whether output and unemployment changes are 
sustainable or not and serve as a yardstick to 
gauge inflationary pressures for monetary policy 
purposes. It has labour-market policy 
implications as well. Reducing the NAWRU 
component of unemployment requires structural 
reforms, whereas the policy mix can only have a 
bearing on cyclical unemployment. 
Potential factors influencing the level of the 
NAWRU 
The level of the NAWRU may depend on a wide 
range of institutional and economic parameters. 
Frictional unemployment might be considered 
largely incompressible, although new techniques 
as Internet job searching or improvements in the 
functioning of public or private placement 
agencies could lower its level. Beyond frictional 
unemployment, structural unemployment can be 
inflated by the mismatch of supply and demand 
in periods of rapid technological change or 
reallocation of demand between sectors. 
Education and training have a key role to play 
here in ensuring that the labour market works 
smoothly, especially for more the vulnerable 
segments of the workforce, namely the young 
and the unskilled. Labour market institutions 
have also recently been highlighted as having 
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potentially adverse effects on structural 
unemployment. Wage bargaining structures, 
employment protection regulations and the 
statutory level of unemployment insurance could, 
if not properly designed, lead to significant wage 
rigidities which hamper adjustment and could 
thus be detrimental to growth and employment. 
In such an environment, macroeconomic shocks 
could generate cyclical unemployment that would 
later coalesce into structural unemployment, as 
the employability of the jobless drops over time, 
effectively excluding them from the labour 
market. Finally a large tax wedge could also lift 
the NAWRU upwards by widening the gap 
between take-home pay for the employee and 
labour costs for the employer. All these factors 
combine to explain the persistence of 
unemployment in Europe, even long after the 
impact of the successive shocks has subsided.18 
Within that conceptual framework, the high level 
of unemployment in the eighties and nineties 
went hand-in-hand with a gradual increase of 
structural unemployment. 
Measurement issues and DG ECFIN's 
specifications 
It is by definition hard to measure structural 
unemployment since it is not directly observable 
and may vary over time. Several indicators can be 
used, notably those based on price inflation 
(NAIRU), wage inflation (NAWRU) or even the 
rate of capacity utilization (NAIRCU). 
Estimation methods also differ. Structural 
methods model price- or wage-setting behaviour, 
while statistical methods focus on the actual 
unemployment rate and split it into trend and 
cyclical components. DG ECFIN has developed 
NAWRU indicators for the whole of the euro 
area and its member States (see Box 3 for 
methodological aspects).19  
                                                     
18  Blanchard O. (2006), 'European unemployment: the 
evolution of facts and ideas', Economic Policy, Vol. 21, No. 
45, pp. 5-59 (January). 
19  These indicators are consistent with the methodology 
used for the determination of output gaps that was 
discussed and approved by the EU's Economic Policy 
Committee and the Ecofin Council. See Denis C., 
Grenouilleau D., Mc Morrow K. and W. Röger (2006); 
'Calculating potential growth rates and output gaps – A 
revised production function approach', European Economy, 
Economic Papers, No. 247 (March). 
Results and lessons drawn from the NAWRU 
in the euro area 
Following a steady increase after the first oil price 
shock of the early seventies, the level of the 
NAWRU has been on a declining trend 
since 1997. From a peak of 9.2% of the labour 
force in 1997, the NAWRU decreased by 1.4 pp. 
to 7.8% in 2006 (latest estimate from the 
Commission's autumn 2006 forecasts). 
Graph 9: Unemployment rate and NAWRU in the euro 
area (in % of labour force – 1980 to 2006) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The reversal in the trend since 1997 is not the 
result of dramatic measures being implemented 
but rather appears to be the outcome of a series 
of incremental reforms launched in various 
Member States that eventually delivered benefits, 
albeit sometimes with a significant lag. It is worth 
noting that the decline in the level of the 
NAWRU persisted even during the recent period 
of soft growth.  
Other ways of depicting the recent positive trend 
yield similar results. The depiction of the wage-
unemployment relationship shows successive 
shifts downwards, starting from 1996-1997, 
which would suggest that the functioning of the 
euro-area labour market has become less rigid 
(Graph 10). 
A similar picture emerges from the examination 
of the Beveridge curve, with a positive evolution 
that takes shape in a leftward drift, though at a 
slightly later point in time (Graph 11). 
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Box 3: Estimating structural unemployment in the euro area 
Structural unemployment can be determined by removing the cyclical component from the observed unemployment 
rate. The cyclical component can be identified via a Phillips curve in accordance with well-established theory. The 
Phillips curve specification used by DG ECFIN is a reduced form which is derived from a standard wage-setting 
curve and a labour-demand equation. 
As regards wage setting, it relates nominal wages demanded by workers to price expectations, to the level of the 
reservation wage, to the expected productivity, and to the unemployment rate. According to the neoclassical model, 
wages are largely determined by the reservation wage, whereas wage-bargaining models attribute a larger role to 
productivity developments. DG ECFIN's chosen specification allows both theoretical strands to be covered. It is 
assumed that price and productivity expectations are backward-looking. The reservation wage, which would –
 according to theory – be a function of labour taxation and the unemployment replacement rate, is not observed. It is 
rather considered a permanent component of the wage equation which is implicitly estimated by a Kalman filter. 
For its part, the labour-demand equation depends on the level of productivity and labour-demand shocks, the latter 
triggering shifts in labour demand. These labour-demand shocks could drive a wedge between productivity and real 
wages and comprise a cyclical component, which derives from labour hoarding, and a permanent component, which 
covers sectoral shifts or changes in mark-ups. Temporary labour-demand shocks are approximated by a first 
difference in the growth rate of the wage share and enter the Phillips curve. 
Rearranging the wage-setting curve and the labour-demand equation gives an estimation of structural unemployment. 
It is also possible to derive the change in wage inflation (wt), which is modelled as a function of labour productivity 
(prt), the wage share (wst), and the deviation of unemployment from structural unemployment (ut-ut*). Terms of 
trade (tott) have been added as an explanatory variable as nominal wages can respond positively to a possible wedge 
between consumer prices and GDP inflation. 
w
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Phillips curve estimates (based on annual data, 1965-2006)  
 Ut-Ut* ∆²PRt ∆²WSt ∆²TOTt ∆²TOTt-1 R² Q-Statistic 
Euro area -0.69(-3.1) 0.82(4.7) 0.99(6.0) 0.03(0.2) 0.31(1.7) 0.52 0.85 
Germany -0.53(-2.6) 0.86(7.2) 1.20 – 0.22(1.6) 0.81 0.23 
France -0.45(-2.2) 0.82(3.8) 0.93(6.8) 0.23(1.7) 0.48(3.6) 0.67 0.90 
Italy -0.50(-0.4) 0.68(2.4) 0.72(3.7) – 0.74(1.6) 0.28 0.36 
Spain -0.39(-2.9) 0.47(2.5) 0.56(3.4) – 0.61(2.6) 0.39 0.59 
T-Statistics in brackets. See for methodology Denis, C. Grenouilleau, D., McMorrow, K. and W. Röger, (2006), 'Calculating potential growth rates 
and output gaps – A revised production function approach', European Economy, No 247.  
The Commission's autumn 2006 forecasts were used to construct 2006 data. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Wage inflation remains sensitive to the unemployment gap once additional parameters are added to the equation to 
control for other factors: one additional point of unemployment depresses wage inflation by 0.69 point in the euro 
area, although the sensitivity is lower (0.4-0.5) for bigger euro-area countries. The influence of productivity is 
noticeable even across large euro-area countries (0.82), which provides support to wage bargaining theories. The 
lagged impact of terms of trade, measured by the difference between consumer and GDP prices, is also significant, 
although less so for Germany. Finally, it is found that wages respond to labour-demand shocks, approximated by 
changes in the wage share. Its impact is somewhat proportional to labour productivity. 
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Graph 10: Unemployment rate and wage growth in the 
euro area (1992-2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 11: Beveridge curve in the euro area  
(1992-2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
While structural unemployment has been on a 
downward path in the euro area as a whole since 
the late 1990s, the labour-market performance 
has varied significantly across individual Member 
State's, reflecting the fact that there are still 
twelve different labour markets, governed by 
national regulations and institutions. Figures 
point to a decrease in the NAWRU in the period 
2001-2005 compared to 1996-2000 in seven 
euro-area Member States. In particular, Finland, 
Spain and Italy have recorded significant 
progress. But structural unemployment has still 
been increasing in Austria, Germany, Greece, 
Luxembourg and Portugal. Uneven progress 
between member States suggests that there is 
still scope for further improvements in the 
functioning of the labour market in many euro-
area Member States.  
In particular, estimates of the NAWRU point to 
a persistently high level of structural 
employment in Germany, with no improvement 
recorded thus far. It would, however, be too 
early to draw any conclusion on the effectiveness 
of the recent Hartz reforms, since the impact of 
reforms usually takes a long time to make itself 
felt in aggregate data. 
Table 6: Estimation of NAWRU in the euro area (1) 
(in %) 
 Average level Forecasts (2) 
 1991-1995 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2005 2006 2008 
BE 8.3 8.0 7.9 7.9 8.0 
DE 7.0 7.9 8.3 8.3 8.2 
EL 8.0 9.3 9.6 9.4 9.1 
ES 15.2 13.8 10.6 8.3 6.9 
FR 9.9 10.3 9.5 9.0 8.6 
IE 13.7 8.1 4.2 4.0 4.4 
IT 9.7 10.0 8.6 7.5 7.0 
LU 2.2 2.6 3.5 4.2 4.5 
NL 5.7 4.1 3.0 3.2 3.0 
AT 3.6 3.9 4.4 4.9 5.1 
PT 5.3 5.2 5.9 6.7 7.4 
FI 11.2 11.9 8.1 7.1 7.0 
Euro 
Area 8.9 9.1 8.3 7.8 7.4 
US 5.7 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.1 
(1) Data in percentage of the labour force. 
(2) Commission autumn 2006 forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Assessing wage elasticity through the 
NAWRU 
The NAWRU model also provides information 
on the elasticity of wages to labour market 
conditions. For the euro area, the elasticity to the 
unemployment gap, measured by the difference 
between headline unemployment and the 
NAWRU, amounts to -0.7, which means that a 
one percent decrease in unemployment would 
increase, in the short run, wage inflation by 
0.7 percent. Estimates differ, however, 
significantly between euro-area countries, 
ranging from -0.4 for Finland to -1.3 for Austria.  
The evolution of unit labour costs in the euro 
area fits well with the unemployment gap, 
although some overshooting can be observed at 
times on account of the productivity cycle 
(Graph 12).  
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Graph 12: Unemployment gap and unit labour costs 
(annual change) in the euro area (1980 to 2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 13: Sensitivity of wages to the unemployment 
gap and dispersion of the unemployment gap (1) 
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(1) The unemployment gap measures the distance to NAWRU, 
dispersion has been calculated over the 1965-2006 period. The beta 
coefficient measures the sensitivity of wage inflation to the 
unemployment gap (estimated NAWRU equations). 
Source: Commission services. 
The elasticity of wage inflation to the 
unemployment gap can inform on the capability 
of the labour market to smooth cyclical 
developments. A higher elasticity would signal 
that the labour market has a better capability to 
adjust quickly to the slack in the economy. In 
countries with labour market rigidities, the 
unemployment would have to deviate 
significantly from its natural rate in order to 
trigger counter-balancing wage pressures. On the 
contrary, countries with flexible labour markets 
would see their wages adjusting quickly, with low 
unemployment fluctuations as a result. Evidence 
from Graph 13 is mixed. A positive correlation 
between wage elasticity and the dispersion of 
unemployment gap exists among euro-area 
Member States, but it is a rather weak one. 
Other factors, such as the design of wage 
bargaining schemes in some countries, might 
also have an influence on the wage-
unemployment relationship. 
Conclusion 
Though its calculation remains dependent on 
many theoretical assumptions and uncertainties, 
the NAWRU is an important indicator for 
measuring structural unemployment and 
assessing the impact of labour markets reforms. 
As the direct estimation of the impact of 
individual labour market reforms is often far 
from being straightforward, it is necessary for 
policy-makers to get an overview of the 
aggregate reaction of the labour market. This is 
all the more necessary as reforms are staggered 
and often deliver benefits with a substantial lag. 
The NAWRU can also provide valuable 
indications on the slack in the economy. 
Evidence suggests that the NAWRU has 
substantially declined in the euro area as a whole 
since 1997. This testifies to the improved 
resilience of the euro area to adverse 
macroeconomic shocks. However structural 
unemployment remains high and there is scope 
for further reforms, especially in countries where 
structural unemployment has not yet decreased. 
It is, in particular, crucial to avoid that cyclical 
improvements in the labour market are captured 
by labour market insiders through wage claims 
that would not be commensurate with medium-
term productivity developments. The 
reintegration of a portion of the workforce that 
has been excluded from the labour market is at 
stake. Other advanced industrialised countries 
have proved that a further reduction of 
structural unemployment is possible, provided 
the pace of reform is not slowed down and 
experiences and lessons learnt are effectively 
shared between euro-area Member States. 
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Focus 
II. Widening current account differences within the euro area  
The dispersion of current account positions within the euro area has widened significantly since the late 1990s as a result of a 
sharp deterioration of current account deficits in Greece, Portugal and Spain and, to a lesser degree, rising surpluses in 
Finland, Germany and the Netherlands. The widening dispersion has been partly driven by a trend towards financial 
deepening in some Member States which has allowed Member States with bigger financing needs to tap international capital 
markets more easily. This can be considered to be a beneficial by-product of the euro and European financial market 
integration. Nevertheless, widening current account differences also reflect a range of less favourable factors which, depending 
on the country considered, include budgetary policy slippages, large disparities in competitiveness developments and 
inappropriate responses of labour markets to productivity shocks or to the constraints imposed by the euro. In some euro-area 
Member States, the accumulation of external deficits has led to a deterioration of net external asset positions which appears 
unmatched in the rest of the OECD. Although immediate risks related to the funding of these high external deficits appear 
negligible in EMU, the pace of accumulation of external debt in these Member States is not sustainable in the long run. The 
transition to more sustainable current account positions will require a marked and lasting improvement in competitiveness. A 
pick-up in productivity growth would ease the necessary adjustment to more sustainable levels of external balances but the fact 
that increased foreign debt has been mostly geared to private consumption and housing investment rather than corporate 
investment is not very encouraging in this respect. 
The dispersion of current account positions 
within the euro area has widened significantly 
since the late 1990s with the emergence, in 
particular, of significant deficits in Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain and of large surpluses in 
Germany, the Netherlands and Finland. This 
focus report seeks to shed some light on the 
factors behind this process. Section 1 sets the 
stage by deriving a few stylised facts from 
analyses of recent developments in current 
account statistics. Section 2 looks at the 
counterpart of these current account data by 
analysing the corresponding capital flows and 
investment/saving balances. Section 3 reviews 
possible explanations for the divergences, while 
Section 4 draws a number of policy lessons.  
1.   Stylised facts of current account 
developments in the euro area 
In this first section we take a look at the data of 
the current account and the international 
investment position to produce stylised facts 
that underpin and set the stage for further 
analysis in the remainder of the report.  
Stylised fact 1: The dispersion of current accounts has 
increased sharply within the euro area since the late 
1990s. The trend is not euro-area specific as it was also 
observed in the rest of the OECD. Although surges in 
dispersion were also observed in the 1970s and 
the 1990s, the current episode appears 
unprecedented in terms of both its strength and 
its duration (Graph 14). 
Graph 14: Dispersion of current account balances 
(standard deviation - % of GDP – 1970-2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
(1) OECD excl. EU, NZ, IS, KO, MX. 
Stylised fact 2: Within the euro area the increased 
dispersion is mostly accounted for by rising current 
account deficits in Greece, Spain and Portugal. Widening 
surpluses in Germany, the Netherlands and Finland 
have also contributed to the rise in dispersion, although 
much more modestly. Dispersion excluding the high-
deficit countries has shown only a modest 
upward trend in recent years and remains well 
below previous peaks (Graph 15). Excluding 
Germany, the Netherlands and Finland also 
reduces dispersion but to a much smaller degree.  
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Graph 15: Dispersion of current account balances 
(standard deviation - % of GDP – 1970-2005) 
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Source:  Commission services. 
Stylised fact 3: Whereas within non-EMU industrialised 
countries a certain polarisation has taken place since the 
late 1990s (countries with a current account deficit in 
1999 have accumulated more deficits since, while 
countries with a positive current account balance in 1999 
have accumulated more current account surpluses), there 
have been large swings in current account positions in the 
euro area since the late-1990s.  
Looking at the dynamics of current accounts in 
the euro area reveals that current account 
positions experienced rapid reversals in some 
euro-area Member States between the end of the 
1990s and the year 2005. These shifts seem to be 
euro-area-specific and contrast with 
developments in the rest of the OECD where 
countries in surplus (or deficit) have tended to 
remain so. They could be a sign that changes in 
current account in the euro area have been in 
part driven by factors specific to that region. 
We broadly distinguish between three groups of 
euro-area Member States: countries experiencing 
substantial current account deficits (Portugal, 
Greece and Spain), large-surplus countries 
(Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Finland) and countries holding a middle-range 
current account (Italy, France, Ireland, Austria 
and Belgium). 
Among the countries with a large current 
account deficit, Portugal and Greece began to 
experience a fall in their external position around 
the mid-1990s, whereas the Spanish current 
account only turned into deficit shortly before 
the start of EMU. All three countries 
Box 4: Should we still care about Member States' current account positions in EMU? 
 
The elimination of national exchange rate risks in EMU greatly facilitates the process of financing individual Member
States’ external deficits. The balance of payments ceases to be an autonomous macroeconomic constraint to become
a mere reflection of domestic agents' borrowing decisions. Therefore, one could argue that because exchange rate 
crises are no longer possible at the Member State level, there is no need for a monitoring of current account 
developments by economic policy makers. 
 
However, in a world of imperfect foresight, imperfect markets and incomplete information, forecasting and
evaluation errors can indeed occur and optimal individual behaviour can sometimes lead to macroeconomic 
problems. In this context, changes in current account positions may not only reflect economic agents' optimal
responses to a changing economic environment, but also the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances. Against this 
background, national current account data remain an important element of the toolkit used for macroeconomic
surveillance in the euro area for several reasons:  
 
¾ Although macroeconomic financing constraints are indeed lessened with the disappearance of exchange rate
premiums, intra-euro-area cross-border financing remains subject to country credit risk, i.e. the risk of
widespread debt default by residents of a particular Member State. If perceptions develop that many borrowers in
deficit economies face debt-servicing difficulties, external imbalances could prove difficult to finance smoothly,
despite the single currency. 
 
¾ Experience with government bond markets suggest that the disciplining role of financial markets may become
less effective in EMU as investors have lost their most effective mechanisms for pricing default risk, namely the
exchange rate premium. In particular, there is a possibility that country risk premia might respond in a non-linear 
way (i.e. responding sharply but late) to possible insolvency problems in a Member State.  
 
¾ In conjunction with other macroeconomic indicators, current account data remain a useful indicator to detect the
emergence of economic imbalances. In a monetary union, possible current account imbalances are likely to last
longer and to be more costly to correct as individual countries have lost the main traditional adjustment
mechanism, i.e. the nominal exchange rate.  
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experienced a deterioration of their current 
account under EMU (Graph 16).  
Graph 16: Current-account balances, euro-area 
Member States with a large deficit 
(% of GDP – 1993-2005) 
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Source:  Commission services. 
In the group of large surpluses, Luxembourg the 
Netherlands and Finland entered EMU with 
sizeable current account surpluses while 
Germany was still reporting a small deficit in 
2000.20 Both Germany and the Netherlands have 
experienced a substantial improvement in their 
current account position in the last few years 
while the Finnish surplus has decreased 
somewhat (Graph 17). 
Graph 17: Current-account balances, euro-area 
Member States with a large surplus  
(% of GDP – 1992-2005) 
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Source:  Commission services. 
                                                     
20 Given the small size of Luxembourg and the fact that the 
country's surplus is largely driven by its key role as an 
international financial centre, we confine our further 
analysis of large-surplus countries to Germany, the 
Netherlands and Finland. 
All other euro-area Member States show 
middle-range current account balances, largely 
within a range of ± 3% of GDP for most years 
since the early 1990s. Within this group, Austria 
has substantially improved its current account 
balance since 1999 whereas all other countries 
have experienced declining current account 
balances over the same period and are now, 
apart from Belgium and Austria, in a deficit 
position.  
Stylised fact 4: Current-account deficits in Greece, 
Portugal and Spain are large relative to deficits in 
non-euro-area OECD countries. Furthermore, even 
though large deficits were also registered in some euro-area 
countries in the 1970s and early 1980s (Ireland and 
Portugal) they were not such an enduring phenomenon as 
they are at present. As a result of large current account 
deficits, the international investment positions of some 
euro-area countries have deteriorated significantly. In 
contrast, Member States with large surpluses post net 
investment positions that are either mildly positive or still 
mildly negative.  
The accumulated deficits of the euro-area 
Member States showing the largest deficits since 
the start of EMU surpass those of the 
non-euro area industrialised countries with 
significant current account deficits (United 
States, Australia, and New Zealand) (Graph 18). 
Accumulated deficits are somewhat lower in 
Spain than in Greece or Portugal as the country's 
external position was relatively balanced until 
1998.  
Portugal already registered significant current 
account deficits in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
However, accumulated deficits in the 1990s 
through to 2005 already surpass those incurred 
earlier while the Portuguese current account is 
forecast to stay around the high 2005 level in the 
years ahead. Spain and Greece never incurred 
current account deficits as large as they do at 
present – and they are also forecast to continue 
to do so for the coming years. The only country 
exceeding present magnitudes of current account 
deficits in the euro area was Ireland until the 
mid-1980s – with its special position in attracting 
inward FDI from (US) multinational companies. 
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Graph 18: Accumulated current account deficits in 
euro-area and other OECD countries  
(% of GDP – 1996-2005) 
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Source:  Commission services. 
 
Graph 19: International Investment Positions, selected 
euro-area Member States (% of GDP – 2005) 
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(1) 2003 for ES, 2004 for DE, NL, FI (latest available data). 
Source: IMF. 
The persistent current account deficits have left 
their mark on the international investment 
position (IIP), the balance sheet of the stock of 
external financial assets and liabilities. Graph 19 
clearly shows the striking scale of negative net 
foreign asset positions for Greece, Spain and 
Portugal. The large-surplus countries do not 
report large positive investment positions and, 
except for Finland, have not experienced large 
improvements in their positions since the mid-
1990s. This highlights the fact that valuation 
effects may strongly distort the link between 
accumulated current account positions and net 
asset positions.21 
2.  Looking at the counterparts of the 
current account 
Capital and financial accounts22  
A look at the capital and financial accounts of 
the balance of payments reveals how the deficit 
countries finance their negative current account 
balances as well as how the surplus countries 
invest their funds. For the three large deficit 
countries (GR, PT, ES), the capital account, 
which takes up capital transfers (e.g. from EU 
structural funds) makes a positive financial 
contribution, in the range of around 1-2% GDP. 
The capital accounts for large-surplus countries 
(DE, NL, FI) only show negligible balances. 
Turning to the financial account, Foreign Direct 
Investment is, on average, not a major or 
continuous source of financing for the large-
deficit countries (Table 7). For 1999-2005 
outgoing direct investment was even bigger than 
incoming direct investment for Spain and 
Portugal. For Greece portfolio investments in 
the form of debt securities, seconded by bank 
loans, are the most important continuous source 
of financing whereas for Portugal the most 
important source of financing is funding through 
the banking industry. For Spain, the banking 
industry is also an important source of financing, 
while incoming portfolio investment in the form 
                                                     
21  The data on the stock of international assets and 
liabilities is subject to a number of valuation effects, 
among which exchange rate movements are an important 
factor. In particular, liabilities for advanced economies 
like the euro area are usually denominated in home 
currency (in euro) whereas foreign assets held outside the 
euro area are usually denominated in foreign currency, 
e.g. the US dollar. A depreciation of the dollar will let the 
value of the assets, when expressed in euro, shrink or will 
magnify the level of liabilities (when expressed in dollars). 
For a more thorough discussion of the IIP and related 
valuation effects, see for example QREA, Volume 4, No. 
3 (2005), pp. 28-30. 
22 Since the introduction of the 5th edition of the IMF 
Balance of Payments Manual, the counterpart to the 
current account is subdivided into a capital account 
(mostly capital transfers) and a financial account (FDI, 
portfolio investment etc.). The change aims at better 
harmonisation with the System of National Accounts 
(SNA)). 
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of debt securities has been on the rise in the 
most recent years. Regarding large-surplus 
countries, outflows of foreign direct investment 
have played a significant role in the case of the 
Netherlands whereas for Finland all forms of 
outgoing investment are important. German 
capital outflows have mainly taken the form of 
loans. 
While a large part of capital inflows have 
transited via the banking industry in the cases of 
Portugal, Greece and Spain, it is interesting to 
note that the German banking industry has 
substantially stepped up the amount of funds 
lent out since 2001, a development which could 
be indicative of the fact that the large current 
account deficits are in part financed by banks in 
large-surplus countries. Such an interpretation is 
also backed by statistics on banks' bilateral 
foreign claims collected by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS). For Portugal, 
Spiegel (2004) concludes that participation in 
EMU has been accompanied by a shift in 
Portugal's foreign borrowing patterns away from 
non-EMU countries and in favour of other 
EMU Member States.23 Overall, this is 
suggestive of the fact that the euro has facilitated 
financial integration between Member States. 
The saving-investment balances 
Data on saving-investment balances can shed 
some light on the factors that have underpinned 
current account developments over the past 
decade (Table 8). In Portugal, the drop in the 
                                                     
23  Spiegel, M.M. (2004), 'Monetary and financial integration: 
evidence from Portuguese borrowing patterns', Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working Paper 2004-07.  
external balance is mostly due to a fall in savings. 
The investment rate surged in the late 1990s but 
has since returned to its trend decline and is now 
at a historical low, while staying broadly stable in 
terms of period averages. In Spain, national 
savings have remained broadly stable and the 
deterioration of the current account can be 
ascribed to a surge in investment, while Greece 
lies somewhere midway between the other two 
countries. All three countries have experienced a 
significant downswing in private savings, 
dominated by a fall in household savings since 
the mid-1990s. During the second half of the 
1990s, the trend decline in private savings was 
partly (or totally in the case of Spain) offset by 
rising public savings. Whereas the offsetting 
effect has continued in Spain during the present 
decade, drops in public savings have aggravated 
external deficits in Portugal and Greece since 
2000. 
As regards the sectoral composition of 
investment, the rise in the investment share in 
Spain has been dominated by construction, 
particularly housing investment. In contrast, the 
rise of the investment share in Greece is 
attributable to equipment while the share of 
housing investment in GDP has remained 
broadly stable. Finally, investment in Portugal 
has been constantly on the decrease in both the 
equipment and the construction sectors since a 
peak in investment activity in 2000. 
Turning to high-surplus countries, the rise in 
surplus observed in Germany and the 
Netherlands since 2001 and 2002, respectively, 
can be traced back to the private sector and in 
particular to the corporate sector. In Germany, 
the investment rate has been on a downward 
Table 7: The financial account (share of GDP in % - period averages) (1) 
 1992-1998 1999-2005 
 Foreign direct invest. 
Portfolio 
investment 
Other invest. of which: 
Banks  
Foreign 
direct invest. 
Portfolio 
investment 
Other invest. of which: 
Banks  
 Large-deficit countries 
EL n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0 6.7 -1.3 2.9 
ES 0.4 0.7 -0.5 0.8 -1.8 0.9 3.4 2.9 
PT 0.5 -0.4 1.8 2.2 -0.4 0.3 6.7 6.7 
 Large-surplus countries 
DE -1.4 1.5 1.0 1.5 0.9 -0.1 -2.7 -2.4 
NL -2.1 -3.6 2.8 2.5 -3.9 1.5 -0.4 1.1 
FI -1.8 2.4 -1.5 -2.2 -1.5 -3.1 -1.6 -1.4 
(1) The table does not contain the entries' Financial Derivatives'; 'Reserve assets' nor 'Net errors and omissions'.  
Source: IMF. 
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path since the beginning of the decade largely on 
account of a weak construction sector. Since 
2003 we can observe a rise in the savings rate 
(mostly in the corporate sector). In the 
Netherlands the rise in the surplus can be 
explained by a combination of weakening 
corporate investment and increasing corporate 
savings while spending in the household sector 
has remained comparatively stronger. Hence, in 
both countries, the rise in the external surplus in 
the past few years seems to largely relate to 
enterprises’ efforts to improve balance sheets.  
The situation is quite different for Finland. 
Following a deep recession in the early 1990s, 
the country underwent profound changes in 
terms of both  macroeconomic management and 
production structures. These changes have left 
their marks on the current account, transforming 
the structural deficit into a large structural 
surplus throughout the 1990s due to substantial 
increases in government and corporate savings 
(i.e. improvements in public finances and 
corporate profits).  
3.  Sources of current account differences 
within the euro area 
Economic theory proposes a large array of 
possible determinants of current account 
positions, ranging from structural factors (e.g. 
demographics, stage of economic development) 
to more cyclical factors (e.g. strength of 
domestic demand, changes in competitiveness 
and fiscal policy). Reviewing possible 
explanations, the present section argues that the 
widening dispersion of current account positions 
within the euro area reflects a combination of 
causes including cyclical differences, financial 
integration, widening differences in competitive 
positions and country-specific shocks.  
Current account differences partly reflect 
differences in cyclical positions… 
Within an economic and monetary union, 
current account differences are part of the 
process of adjustment to cyclical differences. 
Countries in a comparatively stronger cyclical 
position will 'export' activity to the rest of the 
union via their import demand. In addition, 
strong cyclical conditions will also foster 
inflation pressures and which will weigh on 
competitiveness. In this sense, Member States' 
differences in current account positions may be 
interpreted as a natural response to cyclical 
differences. This response has been at play in the 
last few years, as shown by the negative cross-
country correlation between the output gap and 
the current account (Graph 20).24  
Nevertheless the link displayed in Graph 20 
should be interpreted with caution as it appears 
to be fragile: the cross-country correlation was 
weak in the late 1990s and is projected to drop 
again significantly in 2006-2007 in the 
Commission's autumn forecast. Overall, it is 
difficult to attribute the divergence in current 
accounts in the euro area since the late 1990s to 
cyclical factors. Therefore, whereas cyclical 
differences may have contributed to current 
account disparities in recent years, their role has 
probably been modest.  
                                                     
24  Replacing the output gap by the cyclical component of 
domestic demand would not alter the chart significantly, 
suggesting that domestic demand is the main driver of 
the link between the current account and the output gap.  
Table 8:  Saving and investment (share of GDP in % - period averages) (1) 
 1992-1998 1999-2005 
 National savings 
Private 
savings (1) 
Public 
savings 
Total 
Investment 
National 
saving 
Private 
savings 
Public 
savings 
Total 
Investment 
 Large-deficit countries 
EL 18.9 24.0 -5.1 19.9 15.0 15.8 -0.8 23.8 
ES 21.1 22.4 -0.5 21.7 22.5 18.8 3.7 26.7 
PT 20.1 21.5 -1.4 23.5 16.3 17.1 -0.9 24.5 
 Large-surplus countries 
DE 21.1 20.6 0.5 22.0 20.2 20.4 -0.2 19.1 
NL 26.0 25.7 0.3 21.5 26.8 24.2 2.6 20.5 
FI 19.8 20.1 -0.2 17.5 26.9 20.7 6.2 18.7 
(1) Private savings include household and corporate savings. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Graph 20: Cyclical conditions and the current account  
(in % – 2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
… but can also be traced back to EMU 
related structural changes 
The causes of the present current account 
differences between euro-area Member States 
can in part be traced back to the launch of 
EMU. Different needs in terms of nominal 
convergence as well as large disparities in the 
initial degree of integration in Europe's financial 
markets and banking sector have turned the 
launch of the euro into a shock with protracted 
asymmetric effects on some Member States’ 
current accounts. In Greece, Portugal and Spain 
sharp falls in real interest rates during the 
nominal convergence process have fuelled credit 
demand and inflows of foreign capital. This 
stimulating effect has been magnified by 
deepened integration in European financial 
markets, financial market deregulation and a 
concomitant decrease in liquidity constraints.25 
Developments in private-sector debt and a 
strengthening of the link between income and 
the current account provide indirect evidence of 
the importance of this financial deepening 
process.  
Private-sector debt – Private-sector debt has 
increased much more rapidly in Greece, Portugal 
and Spain than in most of the rest of the euro 
area (Graph 21). The ratio of debt to GDP has 
increased both for households and for the 
                                                     
25  It is difficult, however, to disentangle the respective roles 
of the euro, EU financial market integration and 
autonomous financial liberalisation instigated by 
domestic authorities as these factors have been mutually 
reinforcing.  
corporate sector. Starting from a level below the 
euro-area average, Spain and Portugal now 
display the highest ratio of private-sector debt to 
GDP in the euro area next to the Netherlands. 
Debt levels in Greece remain below the euro-
area average, but have risen sharply – at least in 
the household sector – from a comparatively 
very low level in the mid-1990s. These 
developments are suggestive of a strong 
convergence process in private-sector debt 
which could have led to some overshooting in 
Spain and Portugal.26  
Graph 21: Household debt, euro-area Member States 
(in % of GDP) (1) 
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(1) No data available for IE and LU. 
Source: Commission services. 
Current accounts and income. Countries with high 
financing needs (e.g. because they are at a less 
advanced economic stage or because they have a 
comparatively old population) will tend to run 
current account deficits if they can tap 
international financial markets. Therefore, 
financial integration should strengthen the link 
between current account positions and 
demographic factors or income per capita. This 
strengthening has actually been observed in the 
euro area since the mid-1990s. Graph 22 shows 
a relatively strong cross-country correlation 
between income per capita and the current 
account position. The correlation has increased 
significantly over the past decade. Similarly, the 
negative correlation between old-age 
dependency ratios and current account positions 
is now higher than in the mid-1990s.  
                                                     
26  For a discussion of the Portuguese case, see Cardoso, L. 
P. (2005), 'Household behaviour in a monetary union: 
what can we learn from the case of Portugal?', ECFIN 
Country Focus Volume 2, Issue 20.  
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Graph 22: Income per capita and the current account  
(in % – 2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Evidence from simple cross-section correlation 
coefficients should be interpreted with caution, 
but it is backed by econometric analysis. Box 5 
presents the results of a panel regression which 
identifies a structural break in the relation 
between the current account and its 
determinants. Since the late 1990s, the link 
between the current account and income per 
capita has strengthened for EMU countries but 
not for non-European OECD countries. 
Estimated coefficients suggest that the structural 
break amounts to a drop in the ratio of the 
current account to GDP of about 4-5 percent 
points for Member States with per capita GDP 
of 70% of the euro-area average. In the late 
1990s, income per head ranged between 65% 
and 80% of the euro-area average in Greece, 
Portugal and Spain. These results suggest that 
financial market integration has probably 
weighed substantially on current accounts in 
Greece, Portugal and Spain in the last few years. 
Although capital market integration in the 
context of globalisation may also have helped, 
the process seems to be mostly related to 
European integration and to the euro. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning related results 
from a recent ECFIN study. 27 The study, which 
uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to 
analyse adjustment processes within the euro 
area, identifies a cut in the risk premium and a 
                                                     
27  European Commission (2006), ‘Country adjustment 
experience’, Chapter 7 in ‘Dynamic Adjustment in the 
Euro Area: Experiences and Challenges’, EU Economy 
Review 2006.  
loosening of credit constraints as the two most 
important sources of widening external deficits 
in Portugal and Spain since the launch of the 
euro (the study does not cover Greece). 
Current-account differences compounded by 
persistent divergence in competitiveness  
Another explanation for widening differences in 
current account positions within the euro area 
pertains to the divergence of Member States' 
trade performances. Graph 23 decomposes the 
export performance of the euro area into three 
groups of Member States: those with large 
current account deficits (Greece, Portugal and 
Spain) and those with large surpluses (Finland, 
Germany and the Netherlands) and a residual 
group comprising all other Member States. 
Graph 23: Real exports of goods and services 
(average annual growth in %) 
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(1) EL, ES and PT.  (2) DE, FI and NL. (3) AT, BE, FR, IE, IT. 
Source: Commission services. 
Whereas the three groups reported relatively 
similar export growth during most of the 1990s, 
a polarisation process has been visible since the 
beginning of the 2000s. In recent years, 
high-surplus countries have enjoyed a much 
stronger export performance than high-deficit 
countries, with the group comprising the 
remaining Member States located somewhere in 
between. Export growth was particularly rapid in 
Germany and Finland and more moderate 
although still above the average in the 
Netherlands. It was quite sluggish in Portugal 
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Box 5: A panel regression analysis of the determinants of current accounts in OECD countries 
 
Since the seminal work of Chinn and Prasad in 2003, several empirical studies have sought to identify the most 
important determinants of the current account by analysing econometrically large panels of countries (see references 
at the end of the box). Taking a similar approach, the table below reports the results of a panel analysis of the 
determinants of the current account in OECD countries. Several models were tested. 
 
The base model (Column A) tests the impact of the dependency ratio, income per capita, a measure of the cyclical 
strength of domestic demand and government budget balances. Because it results in a better fit, the equation was 
estimated with the balance of goods and services rather than the current account as the dependent variable (the 
better fit could be explained by the fact that changes in the transfer or primary income balances play a significant role 
in explaining changes in current accounts in a few Member States). In line with previous research with OECD 
samples, regression results for the entire OECD sample appear mixed. Cyclical variables such as the strength of 
domestic demand and budget balances are meaningful and show the expected signs. In contrast, structural variables 
are either not significant (income per capita) or borderline significant (dependency ratio). The role of the net 
financial asset position was also tested but was found to be statistically insignificant (although this may be a 
consequence of limited data availability for this variable).  
 
To assess the possibility that financial market integration may have strengthened the relation between current 
account and its structural determinants, dummy variables were used to test both for structural breaks across time and 
for differences between euro-area and other industrialised countries. The results shown in Column B indicate that 
for euro-area countries, the link between the current account and income has strengthened considerably since the 
late 1990s. Although the structural break is also significant for some earlier years in the 1990s, the best fit was 
obtained with the year 1998. In contrast, no significant break could be found for non-European OECD countries. 
As robustness checks, the equation presented in Column B was re-estimated using the current account rather than 
the balance of goods and services as the dependent variable (Column C). The results are qualitatively similar.  
 
Panel estimates of the determinants of current account in OECD countries (1980-2004) 
(endogenous variable: balance of goods and services in % share of GDP) (1) 
 Base model  
(A) 
With structural 
break (B) 
Current account as dependant 
variable (C) 
Relative GDP per capita (2) 0.003 
(0.07) 
-0.017 
(-0.48) 
-0.062* 
(-1.84) 
Dependency ratio -0.453* 
(-1.75) 
-0.511** 
(-2.66) 
-0.282 
(-2.20) 
Strength of domestic demand (3) (4) -0.361** 
(-9.18) 
-0.343** 
(-9.14) 
-0.363** 
(-9.23) 
Budget balance as a share of GDP (4) 0.240** 
(3.89) 
0.195** 
(3.24) 
 0.192**  
(2.60) 
Euro-area Member State dummies:    
GDP per capita  (dummy after 1997) (5)  0.145** 
(7.33) 
0.189** 
(8.72) 
Constant (dummy after 1997) (5)  -14.12** 
(-6.24) 
-19.57** 
(-8.49) 
Adjusted R-squared (weighted) 0.75 0.80 0.75 
Total pool (unbalanced)  546 546 546 
(1) * and ** denote significance at 10% and  5% level. Estimation method: GLS (cross-section weight) with fixed country effects.  T-values 
within parenthesis (White robust standard errors). Countries covered include all EU15 Member States (excluding Luxembourg), Australia, 
Canada, Japan Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and USA. (2) GDP per capital relative to the euro-area average measured 
at PPP exchange rates.  (3) Deviation from trend as measured by an HP filter. Domestic demand excludes changes in stocks. (4) To 
minimise endogneneity problems, the variable is lagged by 1 year. (5) Dummy=1 for euro-area countries from 1998 onwards. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Overall, the estimated equations offer some insight into the source of the widening differences in external balances 
observed in the euro area in recent years. Differences in the cyclical strength of domestic demand seem to have 
played only a modest role. In some Member States, such as Portugal and Greece, budgetary policy may have 
contributed to widen current account deficits although the order of magnitudes involved is relatively small (around 
1 percentage point of GDP in both countries according to the estimated coefficient). In contrast, the euro together 
with European financial market integration and liberalisation may have been a major source of divergence. By 
allowing countries with comparatively low income per capita to benefit from lower interest rates and to tap 
international capital markets more readily, the euro and financial integration have contributed to widening current 
account differences in Europe. For a country with a level of income per capita at 70% of the euro-area average, the 
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estimated dummy represents a drop in the current account of about 4-5 pp. The equation shows that the trend is 
specific to Europe and not observable in the rest of the OECD and cannot therefore be ascribed to globalisation. A 
similar conclusion was reached by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) who, using a different methodology, came up with 
a similar estimate of 6 pp. Unfortunately, it is not possible to test statistically whether the trend is euro-area specific 
or reflects broader European Union integration. However, the fact that the estimated structural break was maximised 
for 1998 suggests that the divergence of external balances has a strong euro dimension.  
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and to a lesser degree in Spain and Greece. 28  
Graph 24: Intra-area real effective exchange rate (1) 
(index 100 in 2000 % – 1990-2006) 
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
High Deficit Countries (2) High Surplus Countries (3)
Other Countries (4) Other Countries (excl. IT)
 
(1) Real effective exchange rate based on export prices relative to 
other euro-area Member States.  
(2) EL, ES and PT. (3) DE, FI and NL. (4) AT, BE, FR, IE, IT. 
Source: Commission services. 
These differences in export performance can be 
largely traced back to developments in price and 
cost competitiveness (Graph 24). Since the mid-
1990s, the group of Member States which now 
posts large external surpluses have benefited 
from steady gains in competitiveness.29 
Meanwhile, countries with large deficits have 
registered a significant deterioration in their 
                                                     
28  Sluggish export growth was not confined to the high-
deficit countries, however. Italy has registered the 
weakest export performance in the euro area since the 
beginning of the decade. As a result, when Italy is 
included, the average export growth of 'other countries' 
is close to that of the high deficit group.  
29  The gains were restricted to Germany and Finland. The 
Netherlands experienced a real exchange rate 
appreciation until the late 1990s/early 2000s, followed by 
a broad stabilisation. 
competitive positions. Large losses in 
competitiveness, however, have not been 
restricted to high-deficit countries and were also 
reported, for instance, in Italy. 
Changes in cost competitiveness between 
countries participating in a monetary union are 
not necessarily a problem. They may translate 
changes in relative prices that are necessary to 
adjust, inter alia, to country differences in 
cyclical positions. In that sense, differences in 
competitiveness and current account positions 
may be a reflection of the adjustment process in 
the euro area. For instance, the German 
economy has undergone a long process of 
competitiveness improvement aimed at 
correcting the sharp competitive losses incurred 
in the wake of unification and at boosting a 
dismal growth performance.  
Nevertheless, a lesson from the early years of 
EMU is that in economies characterised by 
sticky prices and wages, the interplay between 
competitiveness effects and the real interest rate 
channel can slow adjustment and lead to periods 
of overshooting and undershooting in growth 
and prices. In this context, it cannot be excluded 
that, in some Member States, changes in 
competitiveness have gone significantly farther 
than what could be considered as a healthy 
response to growth differences.  
Furthermore, recent developments in 
competitiveness in some Member States are also 
a sign of inefficiencies in the functioning of 
labour markets and of the build-up of further 
imbalances. In Spain and Portugal losses in 
competitiveness can be partly blamed on the 
sluggish response of wages in the face of a sharp 
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productivity slowdown (Table 9). In Portugal, 
losses were compounded by a muted response 
of wages to deteriorating cyclical conditions 
which is suggestive of strong downward 
rigidities in wage formation.30 The Greek 
economy, by contrast, has enjoyed a more 
supportive productivity environment with a 
significant pick-up in labour productivity since 
the late 1990s. However, this advantage has been 
squandered by the difficulties of the wage 
bargaining system in adapting to EMU's 
environment of low inflation. Greek wage 
inflation has decelerated relative to the double 
digit levels registered in the 1990s, but has 
remained well above productivity gains despite a 
still high level of unemployment. In Germany, 
wage increases were in line with labour 
productivity growth, whereas Finland saw some 
deterioration in the match between these two 
variables. Among large-surplus countries, only 
the Netherlands shows, on average, some 
mismatch between growth in wages and labour 
productivity. This reflects the lasting effect of 
strong cyclical conditions in the late 1990s on 
wage inflation in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Table 9: Wages and labour productivity 
(average annual changes in %) 
 Labour productivity 
Compensation per 
worker 
 1991-98 1999-06 1991-98 1999-06 
Euro area 1.9 1.1 3.5 2.6 
 Large-surplus countries 
DE 2.7 1.6 4.7 1.8 
NL 1.2 1.6 3.2 3.8 
FI 2.9 2.0 3.1 3.2 
 Large-deficit countries 
EL 1.2 3.4 11.1 6.4 
ES 1.4 0.4 5.6 3.0 
PT 2.3 0.8 8.9 4.2 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Country-specific factors have also played a 
role 
Finally, a few country-specific factors have also 
contributed to widening the dispersion of 
current accounts in the past few years.  
                                                     
30  See Banco de Portugal, Annual report, (2004) for 
evidence on nominal and real wage rigidities in Portugal.  
Fiscal policy. In Portugal and Greece, swelling 
budget deficits have contributed to widening 
current account deficits in recent years. 
Although the trend is estimated to have been 
reversed in 2006, the government's saving-
investment balance dropped by more than three 
percentage points in Portugal between 1999 and 
2005. A deterioration of a similar magnitude was 
registered in Greece between 1999 and 2004 and 
only partly reversed afterwards. The net impact 
on the current account of worsening 
government budget balances is of course 
difficult to assess as the private sector may adjust 
to changes in fiscal policy. Nevertheless, 
econometric estimations tend to find that 
budgetary policy may have contributed to 
widening current account deficits (in the order 
of around 1 percentage point of GDP for 
Portugal and Greece) (see Box 5). 
Other country-specific factors. Recent current account 
developments in countries with large surpluses 
can in part be related to country-specific factors, 
including shocks incurred before EMU. In 
Germany, competitiveness improvements have 
brought the current account back to the levels of 
surplus registered before unification. High 
current account surpluses in Finland can be seen 
as a legacy of the profound structural changes 
put in place after the severe economic and fiscal 
crisis experienced in the early 1990s. Finally, the 
increase in the Dutch surplus in the last few 
years reflects in part changes in the country's 
supply structure, with the rising importance of 
re-exports and growing exports of natural gas. 
4.  Some policy considerations  
To the extent that it is a sign of better access to 
international capital markets, the divergence of 
current account positions observed within the 
euro area since the mid-1990s may in part be 
considered as a natural, healthy and temporary 
consequence of the European integration 
process and, in particular, of the acceleration in 
financial integration connected to the adoption 
of the euro. This would mean that the current 
account imbalances could be progressively 
reabsorbed without relevant consequences. 
Nevertheless, the divergence process should be 
monitored carefully for two reasons.  
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Firstly, persistent current account deficits have 
entailed the build-up of substantial foreign 
indebtedness in some Member States. At some 
stage the process will have to be halted and 
external deficits reversed. With no possibility of 
nominal exchange rate realignments, this reversal 
could prove costly in terms of reduced GDP 
growth rates. Secondly, it cannot be excluded 
that the divergence process has been associated 
with one form or another of overshooting which 
could aggravate the cost of such reversal.  
Reversing current account deficits – Greece, Portugal 
and Spain now post large foreign debts. Despite 
low interest rates, the deficits in the balance of 
primary income have increased in the three 
countries and now amount to 2-3% of GDP. 
Although the elimination of exchange rate risks 
means that the short-term risk of an abrupt 
reversal of capital flows is negligible, such a pace 
of debt accumulation is clearly not sustainable in 
the long-run and will, at some stage, necessitate a 
substantial cut in current account deficits.31 This 
requires a change in relative prices – i.e. a fall in 
the real exchange rate – in order to boost 
exports and to shift domestic demand away 
from imports to domestic production. In EMU, 
changes in price competitiveness can no longer 
be achieved by nominal exchange rate 
realignments and therefore require a period of 
slow growth in unit labour costs which can in 
turn be achieved either via wage moderation or 
via faster productivity gains.32  
A process of competitiveness improvement via 
wage moderation is likely to be costly as it may 
imply a protracted period of slower GDP 
growth. To the extent that wages display 
downward nominal rigidities, improvements in 
real exchange rates via wage moderation can be 
particularly slow in the environment of low 
inflation that characterises EMU. Furthermore, 
as shown by the painful competitiveness 
                                                     
31  It can be argued that although exchange risks have been 
curbed, bankruptcy risks remain especially for lending to 
the private sector. A scenario of large increases in 
bankruptcy risk premia cannot be ruled out in the long-
run if financial operators begin to perceive the current 
account in a Member State to be unsustainable. 
32  For a detailed discussion of the Portuguese situation see 
Blanchard, O. (2006), 'Adjustment with the euro. The 
difficult case of Portugal.', Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Department of Economics, Working Paper 
06-04, February. 
adjustment process registered in Germany over 
the past ten years, wage moderation can come at 
a significant cost in terms of growth in domestic 
demand.  
Boosting competitiveness via productivity 
improvements is obviously a better route. 
However, recent developments in this area in 
high-deficit countries have not been very 
encouraging except, to some extent, in Greece. 
Since the mid-1990s high capital inflows have 
been geared to consumption or housing 
investment and have therefore not been very 
conducive to gains in corporate productivity. 
The trend has been particularly pronounced in 
Portugal where investment in equipment is still 
well below its peak in 2000. In addition, the 
productivity performance of both Spain and 
Portugal, countries which are still in a catching-
up process in terms of income per capita and are 
therefore presumably still located inside the 
technology frontier, has not been in line with 
expectations since the beginning of the decade. 
Overall, prospects for a rapid improvement in 
competitiveness underpinned by a pick-up in 
productivity appear thin in these two countries. 
Stronger deregulation could contribute 
substantially to address this challenge, as more 
competition should lead to stronger productivity 
gains. 
Risks of overshooting. In those Member States 
where the deterioration of current accounts can 
partly be explained by financial market 
integration and deregulation, there is a possibility 
that the rise in indebtedness has been partly 
fuelled by an overly optimistic reassessment of 
long-term income prospects. Developments in 
some EU Member States in the 1980s reveal that 
phases of rapid financial market liberalisation 
and deepening may lead to a temporary build-up 
of excessively optimistic expectations, as 
economic agents need time to fully understand 
the implications of their changing 
environment.33 In the case of Greece, Portugal 
and Spain, the risk of over-optimistic growth 
expectations may be increased by the fact that 
financial deepening takes place in the context of 
a catching-up process and may be associated 
                                                     
33  For a discussion of how these factors have been at play 
in the UK and Nordic countries in the 1980s, see 
Debelle, G. (2004), ‘Macroeconomic implications of 
rising household debt’, BIS Working Paper No 153, June. 
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with excessive expectations about the positive 
effect of the euro on the speed of convergence.  
Risks of overshooting not only relate to 
overoptimistic income expectations, they are 
also linked to developments in real exchange 
rates. As emphasised in the previous section, in a 
monetary union, the interplay between wage 
rigidities and interest rates may lead to periods of 
excessive real exchange rates appreciation or 
depreciation. In addition to overshooting, 
competitiveness may be hampered by an 
inappropriate response of labour markets to 
productivity shocks (as has been the case in 
Spain and Portugal in recent years), or to the 
constraints of the euro (as in Greece).  
Whatever the source of the overshooting, it 
cannot be excluded that current account deficits 
have deteriorated farther than would be justified 
by changes in the inter-temporal allocation of 
consumption in a situation of financial market 
integration. The presence and magnitude of 
overshooting is difficult to assess but it will 
make any adjustment of large current account 
deficits more costly in terms of growth.  
In the light of these considerations, several 
policy lessons can be drawn from the analysis 
presented in this focus report.  
Firstly, budgetary policy can help absorb shocks 
such as a rise in private sector indebtedness 
consecutive to structural change in the financial 
markets. In Spain, rising public savings have 
helped to contain the fall in private sector 
savings, curbing the accumulation of current 
account deficits compared with Greece and 
Portugal. In the latter two countries, a fall in 
public savings compounded the deterioration in 
current accounts.  
Secondly, wage bargaining systems in some 
Member States have not yet fully assimilated the 
constraints posed by the euro. To avoid major 
deterioration in competitiveness, which will 
ultimately be costly to reverse, wages need to be 
aligned on productivity developments. In 
particular, restoring lost competitiveness will 
involve a period of wage moderation. 
Downward wage rigidities such as those shown 
in Portugal in recent years can only delay this 
process and make it ultimately more costly.  
Thirdly, the process of bringing external deficits 
back to equilibrium and restoring 
competitiveness would be facilitated by policies 
geared to improving productivity. In this 
context, further deregulation of labour and 
product markets will increase competitive forces, 
which will, in turn, boost productivity. This 
argument is at the very heart of the European 
Internal Market, i.e. to increase efficiency 
through an optimal allocation of resources, in 
order to exploit the growth potential of 
European economies. 
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Focus 
III. Ensuring fiscal sustainability in the euro area:  
achievements and remaining challenges  
In the coming decades, the euro-area's population will undergo dramatic demographic changes due to low fertility rates, 
continuous increases in life expectancy and the retirement of the baby-boom generation. Ageing populations will pose major 
economic, budgetary and social challenges for the euro area as well as for the rest of the EU. They are projected to have a 
significant impact on growth and lead to significant pressures to increase public spending. This will make it difficult for 
Member States in the euro area to maintain sound and sustainable public finances over the long-term, but it is particularly 
important for the euro area to work  resolutely towards that goal nevertheless,  as continuous high deficits and ensuing high 
debt levels in some countries could have an adverse impact on macro-economic conditions for other euro-area countries. 
Therefore, ensuring fiscal sustainability in the euro area requires time-consistent policies, which means addressing budgetary 
imbalances before the budgetary impact of ageing sets in, and a broad approach, consisting of fiscal consolidation, efforts to 
increase employment and enhance productivity, and structural reforms that prepare the euro-area's social models to meet the 
challenges ahead.  
1.  The long-term fiscal sustainability 
challenge in the euro area34 
A significant proportion of the euro-area's public 
expenditure goes into financing the provision of 
public goods, services and insurance systems, 
which are at the core of how the euro-area 
societies are set up. These systems – or ‘social 
models’ – are not immutable, but depend upon 
the size and composition of the population. If 
current policies are allowed to continue in the 
future, demographic change will create enormous 
pressure for higher public expenditure. Euro-area 
members will need to find ways of maintaining 
sound and sustainable public finances over the 
long term. To do so they will need to make 
progress on three fronts: reduce government 
debt at a fast pace, raise employment rates and 
productivity, and reform social systems.  
The risks associated with unsustainable public 
finances have long been a cause for concern to 
economists and policy-makers alike. In the 
European Union, the need to strengthen 
budgetary positions and reduce public debt levels 
to create a buffer against the pressures that 
population ageing will put on government 
budgets in the not-too-distant future has received 
                                                     
34  This focus section draws upon the detailed analysis in 
European Commission (2006), 'Long-term sustainability 
of public finances in the European Union', European 
Economy 4/2006.  
considerable attention since the late 1990s. In the 
European Economic and Monetary Union, the 
issue of safeguarding long-term fiscal 
sustainability is at the core of the fiscal 
framework.  
The importance of ensuring fiscal sustainability 
in the long run has been the backdrop for the 
increased focus on long-term fiscal sustainability 
in the EU's budgetary surveillance armoury, in 
particular in the reform of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) last year. Consistency 
between medium-term budgetary targets and 
long-term sustainability is thus increasingly at the 
core of fiscal surveillance in the euro area.  
2.  The concept of long-term fiscal 
sustainability 
Public finance sustainability is a multi-faceted 
issue and there is no agreed definition on what a 
sustainable debt position is. Blanchard et al. 
(1990) consider that 'it is essentially about whether, 
based on the policy currently on the books, a government is 
headed towards excessive debt accumulation'.35  
 
                                                     
35  See Blanchard et al. (1990), 'The sustainability of fiscal 
policy: new answers to an old question', OECD Economic 
studies, No 15. 
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The time horizon depends on the purpose of 
the analysis  
The time horizon over which debt sustainability 
is analysed, depends on the purpose of the 
analysis. In some cases, it might be relatively 
short, for example where the purpose is to 
evaluate short- to medium-term dynamics of 
debt or to analyse the dynamics of debt servicing, 
including in many cases external debt service.   
In the case of the assessment of the long-term 
sustainability of public finances, the time horizon 
needs to be considerably longer – say for 
instance 40 to 50 years – to assess the budgetary 
impact of government commitments, notably 
regarding pensions. 
The government's inter-temporal budget 
constraint needs to be fulfilled… 
For the purposes of assessing sustainability of 
public finances over the long-term in view of the 
budgetary challenge posed by ageing populations, 
debt sustainability may be defined in two 
alternative ways: 
¾ A first definition of sustainability is derived 
from the government's inter-temporal budget 
constraint. This states that current total 
liabilities of the government, i.e. the current 
public debt and the discounted value of all 
future expenditure, should be covered by the 
discounted value of all future government 
revenue over an infinite horizon. If current 
policies ensure that the government's inter-
temporal budget constraint is fulfilled, current 
policies are financially sustainable.  
¾ Whether the abovementioned condition is 
met over an infinite horizon can be 
approximated by looking over a finite period 
to assess if current policies ensure a specific 
debt level to be reached at a given date.  
…and sustainability gap indicators provide a 
summary measure of the size of inter-
temporal imbalances 
However, assessing the long-term sustainability 
of public finances entails more than simply 
answering the question whether current policies 
are sustainable or not. The size of the budgetary 
imbalances must also be estimated. This is 
provided by sustainability gap indicators that 
measure the size of a permanent budgetary 
adjustment (e.g. a constant reduction of 
non-age-related public expenditure as a share of 
GDP or a constant increase in public revenue as 
a share of GDP) that makes it possible to meet 
one of the following conditions: 
¾ reaching a target of 60% of GDP for the 
Maastricht debt in 2050 (the S1 indicator); 
¾ fulfilling the inter-temporal budget constraint 
over an infinite horizon (the S2 indicator).36 
The two sustainability indicators translate current 
and future budgetary imbalances into synthetic 
measures that can be simply expressed as a sum 
of three different components. This 
decomposition of the indicators gives additional 
insight into the numerical results of the 
indicators (see Table 10). It also makes it possible 
to determine for each country whether the risks 
to the sustainability of public finances stem from 
the initial budgetary position and/or a large 
increase in age-related expenditure over the long 
term. 
Table 10: Decomposition of the indicators 
Impact of: 
 
Initial 
budgetary 
position 
Debt 
requirement in 
2050 
Long-term changes 
in the primary 
balance 
S1= 
Gap to the 
debt-
stabilising 
primary 
balance 
+
Additional 
adjustment 
required to 
reach a debt 
target of 
60% of 
GDP in 
2050 
+ 
Additional 
adjustment 
required to 
finance the 
increase in 
public 
expenditure up to 
2050 
S2= 
Gap to the 
debt-
stabilising 
primary 
balance 
+ 0 + 
Additional 
adjustment 
required to 
finance the 
increase in 
public 
expenditure over 
an infinite horizon 
Source: Commission services. 
A high positive contribution of the current 
budgetary position (1st column) signals that the 
                                                     
36  The detailed properties of the sustainability gap indicators 
are described in Annex 1 of European Commission 
(2006), ‘Long-term sustainability of the public finances in 
the European Union', European Economy, No.  4/2006. 
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current level of the primary balance, if 
maintained, will lead to an explosive debt even 
before considering the long-term impact of 
ageing. A high positive contribution of the long-
term changes in the primary balance (last 
column) signals that the impact of ageing on 
public expenditure is expected to be large.  
To this end, a small sustainability gap may cover 
quite different situations. In some cases, it stems 
from a debt-stabilising budget balance and a 
small ageing impact on public finances. In other 
cases, it stems from a very strong budgetary 
position today with large primary surpluses that 
enable to compensate for a significant projected 
rise in age-related expenditure. 
Underlying long-term expenditure 
projections 
Budgetary projections over the long term must 
necessarily be based on a set of assumptions – 
demographic and macroeconomic - which can 
have a very large impact on the results. Thus, in 
the EUs multilateral budgetary surveillance and 
especially in the euro area, having a common 
setting for the projections for the purposes of 
analysing and assessing fiscal sustainability is 
essential to ensure equal treatment. This was the 
main motivation behind the 2006 common 
budgetary projections exercise, carried out by the 
European Commission together with national 
authorities working through the Economic Policy 
Committee.37 
The common projections used in the analysis 
concern the following five age-related 
expenditure items: gross public pensions, 
healthcare, long-term care, education, and 
unemployment benefits.  
Overall, age-related expenditure in the euro area 
is projected to increase by about 4% of GDP up 
to 2050, although this hides very different 
developments in different countries (Graph 25). 
Most of the projected increase in public spending 
will be on pensions and, to a lesser degree, on 
                                                     
37  These projections can be found in Economic Policy 
Committee and the European Commission (2006), 'The 
impact of ageing on public expenditure for the EU25 
Member States on pensions, health care, long-term care, 
education and unemployment transfers (2004-2050)', 
European Economy, Special Reports No 1/2006.  
health care and long-term care. The potential 
offsetting savings in terms of projected public 
spending on education and unemployment 
benefits are likely to be limited. 
Graph 25: Age-related expenditure in the euro area 
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(1)No pension projections were available for Greece in the new 
common projections exercise and the rise in age-related expenditure 
is therefore underestimated. Pension expenditure in Greece was 
projected to rise between 2005 and 2050 by 10.2% in the 2002 
Greek stability programme. 
Source: EPC and EC (2006), Commission services. 
3.  Main results 
This section presents the calculation of the 
sustainability gap indicators and its 
decomposition into the long-term and medium-
term impact for the euro area and its members. 
 Table 11 presents the results of the S2 
sustainability gap indicator, which have been 
calculated on the basis of the structural budgetary 
position in 2005 and the projected change in age-
related expenditure in the period to 2050. 
In the euro area as a whole, the sustainability gap 
is about 3½ % of GDP according to the S2 
indicator. The long-term budgetary impact of 
ageing is the main factor behind the sustainability 
gap. 
The euro-area average, however, masks 
considerable variety between the Member States. 
Overall, all euro-area members but one (Finland) 
have sustainability gaps. This implies that based 
on the current budgetary position and with no 
changes in policies, an adjustment is necessary so 
as to render the public finances sustainable over 
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the long term for most euro-area members. In 
eight countries, a considerable adjustment, of 
more than 2% of GDP, is required.  
Table 11: Sustainability gap indicators 
(% of GDP) (1) 
 S2 sustainability gap (2) 
 Total IBP  LTC  
BE 1.8 -3.5 5.3 
DE 4.4 1.6 2.8 
EL (2) 3.0 2.2 0.9 
ES 3.2 -2.7 5.9 
FR 4.0 1.4 2.6 
IE 2.9 -3.1 6.0 
IT 3.1 1.3 1.8 
LU 9.5 1.2 8.3 
NL 1.3 -3.1 4.4 
AT 0.3 -0.8 1.1 
PT 10.5 3.8 6.7 
FI -0.9 -5.1 4.2 
EA (2) 3.5 0.2 3.3 
(1) IBP = the initial budgetary position, LTC = the long-term 
changes in the primary balance. 
(2) See notes to Graph 25. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
The long-term budgetary impact of ageing 
The decomposition of the sustainability gap 
indicators (see Table 11) provides information on 
the pure budgetary impact of ageing, and on the 
long-term change in the budgetary position 
(LTC) which, for the euro area, amounts to 3¼% 
of GDP. The situation however varies greatly 
among the euro-area members, as a result of the 
diversity and degree of maturity of their public 
pension arrangements and the effects of pension 
reforms enacted so far. 
¾ The long-term budgetary impact of ageing is 
very significant in Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Ireland, Spain and Belgium, with an increase 
of close to 5% of GDP or more. These 
countries have either so far made only limited 
progress in reforming their pension systems 
so as to limit the projected increase in public 
pensions, or have pension systems that are 
still maturing.  
¾ For a second group of countries - the 
Netherlands, Finland, Germany and France - 
the long-term budgetary impact of ageing is 
more limited, ranging from 2% to 5% of 
GDP. Several of these countries have 
implemented pension reforms that are 
helping to limit the increase in pension 
expenditure (Finland, France and Germany), 
while the projected increase in public pension 
expenditure is also limited in the Netherlands, 
owing to its historically stronger reliance on 
private pension arrangements.  
¾ Finally, the increase is more moderate, 2% of 
GDP or less, in Italy and Austria, which have 
implemented comprehensive pension 
reforms. For these countries, with a relatively 
limited long-term budgetary impact of ageing 
as mentioned above, the projected increase in 
expenditure on health care and on long-term 
care more generally is greater than the 
increase on pensions.  
Concerning Greece, it should be noted that 
projections for pension expenditure and long-
term care were not available for the 
Commission's Sustainability Report.38 The rise in 
its age-related expenditure is therefore 
underestimated. In its 2002 stability programme, 
Greece projected pension expenditure to rise by 
10.2% of GDP between 2005 and 2050.  
The impact of the initial budgetary position 
In addition to the long-term budgetary impact of 
ageing, the current budgetary position and level 
of debt can also present a risk to the 
sustainability of public finances. Indeed, Table 11 
shows that there is a risk of unsustainable public 
finances even before the long-term budgetary 
impact of ageing populations in the euro area is 
considered, which highlights the importance of 
fiscal consolidation.  
There are however large variations in terms of 
the initial budgetary positions among euro-area 
members. In half of the countries (PT, EL, DE, 
FR, IT and LU), the initial budgetary position 
poses a risk and the structural primary balance 
must be improved to avoid their public finances 
taking an unsustainable path even before the 
long-term impact of ageing is considered.  This is 
a matter of urgency, particularly for those 
countries which have a high debt/GDP ratio 
such as Italy and Greece. 
                                                     
38  See European Commission (2006), 'Long-term 
sustainability of public finances in the European Union', 
European Economy, No. 4/2006. 
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For the remaining six countries (AT, ES, IE, NL, 
BE and FI), the current budgetary position is 
such that the public finances would be on a 
sustainable path if there were no long-term 
impact of ageing to consider. They can however 
cover part of the budgetary impact of ageing over 
the long term by reducing their public debt 
and/or accumulating assets in the next few 
decades. 
Graph 26 decomposes the sustainability gap 
indicators into the impact of: (i) the initial 
budgetary position on the horizontal axis, where 
the stronger the fiscal position, the further to the 
left the country appears; and, (ii) the long-term 
budgetary impact of ageing on the vertical axis, 
where the smaller the impact of ageing, the 
further to the bottom is the country. Nearly all 
countries have positive sustainability gaps and are 
thus above the sustainability diagonal. 
Graph 26: Decomposing the sustainability indicators(1) 
BE
DE
EL
ES
FR
IE
IT
LU
NL
AT
PT
FI
EU12
-1.0
1.0
3.0
5.0
7.0
9.0
-6.0 -4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0
% of GDP
%
 of
 G
DP
Small (or negative) 
budgetary impact of ageing
Large budgetary 
impact of ageing
Favorable initial fiscal position Unfavorable initial fiscal position
Negative sustainability gap
Positive sustainability gap
 
(1) See notes to Graph 25.  
Source: Commission services. 
Government debt projections 
The debt/GDP ratio is projected to remain 
above 60% of GDP over the coming decades in 
the euro area. Towards 2020, it is projected to 
start rising considerably and to reach nearly 
200% of GDP in 2050, which clearly indicates 
that public finances are on an unsustainable path.  
The debt/GDP ratio is currently above the 
Treaty reference value of 60% of GDP in seven 
countries (BE, DE, EL, FR, IT, AT and PT), 
which makes debt reduction a matter of urgency 
in these cases. For countries with a very high 
government debt level, i.e. above 100% of GDP 
such as Greece and Italy, public finance 
consolidation is therefore of the utmost 
importance. 
4.  Sensitivity of the results 
The sustainability indicators are sensitive to a 
number of underlying assumptions, required to 
project developments in public finances over a 
long period of time. Given the uncertainties 
surrounding the assumptions it is important to 
test the robustness of the results.  
There are some uncertainties about assumptions 
regarding the demographic and economic 
outlook over the long term. Changes in 
assumptions on key variables, such as life 
expectancy, employment and productivity, can 
have a considerable impact on the results. For 
example, an increase in the total employment rate 
would reduce public expenditure as a share of 
GDP. In particular, pension expenditure would 
be lower if the employment of older workers 
increased, since it would reduce the number of 
retirees, but the total impact would depend on 
the extent to which those older workers would 
then be entitled to higher pensions as a result of 
extending their working lives. 
There is also some uncertainty regarding the 
main drivers of some public expenditure items 
such as health care and long-term care. There has 
been an upward trend in health-care expenditure 
as a share of GDP in most euro-area Member 
States in the past even though the increase in the 
old-age dependency ratio in the euro area has 
been limited. Hence, there is a distinct possibility 
that public health-care expenditure will increase 
faster than implied solely by demographic 
factors, which would prove to be even more 
challenging. 
Finally and importantly, the initial budgetary 
position (the current structural primary balance 
and debt) has a strong one-to-one impact on the 
sustainability gap indicators. A large majority of 
euro-area countries still have budget deficits 
above their medium-term objectives (MTOs) - 
defined for the first time in the 2005/06 updated 
stability and convergence programmes according 
to the principles of the revised SGP - and plan to 
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consolidate their public finances over the next 
few years; it is therefore important to estimate 
the impact of such medium-term budgetary 
developments.39 To illustrate this point, the 
remainder of this section analyses the implication 
for sustainability of an MTO scenario where all 
Member States attain their MTOs in 2010.40  
Structural balances below the MTOs in most 
euro-area countries 
Table 12 shows that a majority of the euro-area 
countries were not at their MTO in 2005. For 
most of them, attaining the MTOs will imply a 
budgetary consolidation over the medium-term 
and for five (DE, EL, FR, IT and PT), the 
budgetary consolidation required to reach their 
MTOs amounts to more than 2% of GDP. 
The MTO is defined in terms of structural 
government balance. For the purposes of long-
term public finance sustainability analysis, one 
has to refer to the structural primary balance 
underlying the MTO in 2010. In the MTO 
scenario, the structural primary balance in 2010 is 
calculated with the following assumptions: 
¾ the general government balance is assumed to 
converge in a linear fashion towards the 
MTO in 2010 and the cyclical impact is 
assumed to be zero by 2010; 
¾ the interest rate on debt in 2010 is assumed to 
be the implicit interest rate on debt in the last 
                                                     
39  The reformed SGP specifies that MTOs should pursue a 
triple aim, namely: (i) providing a safety margin with 
respect to the 3 percent deficit limit; (ii) ensuring rapid 
progress towards sustainability; and (iii) taking the first 
two objectives into account, allow room for budgetary 
manoeuvre, in particular taking into account the needs for 
public investment. Country-specific MTOs in the current 
phase were set by the Member States themselves, taking 
into account: (i) the current government debt ratio (in 
2004); (ii) potential economic growth (average 2005-
2050); and, (iii) a measure of a safety margin with respect 
to the reference value of 3 percent of GDP. For a 
discussion of the MTOs and the experiences one year 
after the reform of the SGP, see Parts II.2 and II.3 of 
European Commission (2006), 'Public Finances in EMU 
– 2006', European Economy, No. 3/2006. 
40  The MTO scenario is a sensitivity test related to the initial 
budgetary position. It does not mean that the 
Commission expects all countries to reach the MTO 
exactly in 2010; some countries had already attained their 
MTO in 2005, while some might reach it only after 2010. 
year of the stability/convergence programme 
of the country concerned.  
Table 12: Structural balances in 2005 and 2010 (MTO 
scenario) (% of GDP) (1) 
 2005 (2)  2010 (3) 
 
Struct. 
balance
Struct. 
prim. 
balance
MTO 
in the 
SCPs 
Struct. 
balance 
Struct. 
prim. 
balance
BE (1) 0.1 4.5 0.5 0.5 3.7 
DE -3.1 -0.3 0 0 2.8 
EL -5.3 -0.3 0 0 4.3 
ES 1.3 3.1 0 0 1.2 
FR -3.1 -0.5 0 0 2.5 
IE 1.9 3.1 ≈ 0.0 0 0.8 
IT -3.9 0.6 0 0 4.5 
LU -1.3 -1.2 -0.8 -0.8 -0.5 
NL 1.0 3.6 -1.0 to -0.5 -0.75 1.4 
AT -1.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 2.4 
PT -5.2 -2.5 >-0.5 -0.5 2.5 
FI 3.2 4.7 ≈ 1½ 1.5 2.3 
(1) In BE, the rapidly declining debt will significantly reduce interest 
payments up to 2010; the primary balance underlying the MTO is 
therefore lower in 2010 than it would be today with the same deficit 
target.. 
(2) As estimated in the Commission's Spring 2006 forecasts.  
(3) MTO scenario. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
The sustainability gap is reduced 
significantly in the MTO scenario  
The long-term budgetary impact of ageing (LTC) 
in the MTO scenario is the same as in the 
baseline scenario (see Table 11). However, the 
initial budgetary position (IBP) is different for 
most countries. This reflects the fact that most 
countries were not at their MTO in 2005, as 
shown in Table 12. The change in the 
sustainability gaps can therefore be attributed to 
the difference in the initial budgetary position, 
i.e. the structural primary balance in 2010 
consistent with the MTO and the level of debt in 
2010.  
Indeed, Table 13 shows that on average in the 
euro area, the outlook in the MTO scenario is 
more positive than the baseline scenario based 
on the 2005 budgetary outcomes. In fact, the 
sustainability gap (at 1½% of GDP) would be 
more than halved if the MTOs were attained in 
2010 by all euro area members. 
The considerable improvements in most 
countries, notably the large ones, contribute to 
this. This is particularly important for the 
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countries that have an S2 sustainability gap larger 
than 2% of GDP in the baseline scenario (DE, 
EL, FR, IT, LU and PT). In a number of 
countries (DE, FR and IT) the gap even falls 
below 2% of GDP under the assumption that the 
MTO is reached.  
Table 13: Sustainability gap indicators – MTO scenario 
(% of GDP) (1) 
 S2 sustainability gap (2) 
 Total IBP  LTC  
BE 2.7 -2.6  5.3 
DE 1.2 -1.6  2.8 
EL (2) -1.8 -2.7  0.9 
ES 5.2 -0.7  5.9 
FR 0.9 -1.7  2.6 
IE 5.3 -0.7  6.0 
IT -1.1 -2.9  1.8 
LU 8.9 0.5  8.3 
NL 3.6 -0.8  4.4 
AT -0.5 -1.5  1.1 
PT 5.2 -1.5  6.7 
FI 1.6 -2.6  4.2 
EA (2) 1.6 -1.7  3.3 
(1) IBP = the initial budgetary position, LTC = the long-term 
changes in the primary balance. 
(2) See notes to Graph 25. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Another sensitivity test regarding budgetary 
consolidation is the 'cost of a delay'. It shows the 
increase in the sustainability gap that would result 
from a delay of five years in implementing 
budgetary consolidation compared to the 
baseline. Such a delay is estimated to result in an 
increase of the S2 sustainability gap indicator for 
the euro area of around 0.3 pp. of GDP. The size 
of the necessary adjustment increases over time, 
making it more costly to address the challenge in 
the future than today. 
Government debt projections in the MTO 
scenario 
The considerable impact that reaching the MTOs 
will have on future debt developments is 
apparent also from Graph 27, which compares 
debt developments with the baseline. Under this 
assumption, government debt would reach about 
80% of GDP in 2050 in the euro area in the 
MTO scenario, as compared with the 200% 
projected in the baseline scenario.  
Fiscal consolidation can contribute very 
significantly to reducing future debt levels. 
Indeed, a majority of euro area members would 
have significantly lower government debt levels if 
the MTOs are attained in 2010 (see Table 14). 
Consolidating the public finances over the 
medium term enables the debt/GDP ratio to be 
reduced in the coming decades, a reduction 
which absorbs part of the long-term budgetary 
impact of an ageing population.  
Graph 27: Debt developments, euro area 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Table 14: Gross debt developments (% of GDP) 
 2005 2050 
  Baseline scenario 
MTO 
scenario 
BE  93.3  83  129 
DE  67.7  261  65 
EL (1)  107.5  255  -56 
ES  43.2  72  198 
FR  66.8  239  66 
IE  27.6  31  157 
IT  106.4  261  1 
LU  6.2  268  240 
NL  52.9  47  176 
AT  62.9  63  18 
PT  63.9  528  208 
FI  41.1  -42  96 
EA   70.0  196  83 
(1) See notes to Graph 25. 
Source: Commission services. 
5.  Other factors relevant for assessing 
fiscal sustainability 
Current government debt 
The level of the outstanding government debt is 
arguably the most important additional factor. 
While the sustainability gap indicators already 
include information on the current level of debt, 
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they do not incorporate all the specific risks 
faced by countries with a large initial debt level. 
For example, high-debt countries are more 
sensitive to shocks to economic growth and to 
interest rate changes in the short/medium term. 
Table 15 shows that if the real interest rate was 
1 pp. higher, the initial budgetary position, i.e. 
the difference between the current structural 
primary balance and the debt-stabilising one, 
would increase by at least ¾% of GDP for 
countries with currently high levels of 
government debt. 
Table 15: Impact of a higher interest rate on the 
initial budgetary position (% of GDP) (1) 
 Initial budgetary position (2) 
 Baseline Higher interest rate 
BE  -3.5  -2.8 
EL  2.2  3.2 
IT  1.3  2.3 
EA  0.2  0.7 
(1) In the 'baseline' scenario a 3% real interest rate is assumed. In 
the 'higher interest rate' scenario, a 4% of GDP real interest rate is 
assumed. 
(2) See table 10. 
Source: Commission services. 
Risks related to the projected evolution of 
pension expenditure 
In some countries, a considerable decrease in the 
ratio of pension benefits to GDP is projected 
(DE, FR, IT, AT and PT). However, the 
purchasing power of pensions is still projected to 
increase in real terms – though at a significantly 
slower pace than wages, which may cast some 
doubt on the "social" sustainability of current 
arrangements.  
It is, difficult to draw clear-cut conclusions for 
the euro area as a whole given the diversity of 
pension arrangements. Nevertheless, it can be 
stated that a decrease in the public benefit ratio 
may lead to further risks to public finances, 
notably if: (i) it leads to a substantial increase in 
the poverty rate of older people; (ii) it leads to a 
large increase in contributions of private 
occupational and/or supplementary schemes 
over the long term, which may affect public 
revenue in the medium-term (for instance 
because of possible tax breaks on investment in 
private pension schemes); (iii) there are obstacles 
to the job activity of older workers that prevent 
them from accumulating additional pension 
rights, or if prolonging their working lives 
substantially does not result in a substantial 
increase in pensions.  
Thus, notwithstanding data availability 
limitations, looking at how the public benefit 
ratio will evolve can help qualify the assessment 
of public finance sustainability. In order to 
reduce the risks stemming from relatively low 
average public pensions in the future, it is of 
prime importance for the euro area to raise 
employment rates, notably of older workers.  
Changes in the revenue ratio over the long 
term 
A 'basic' approach to project public primary 
revenue over the long term is to assume that the 
revenue/GDP ratio is constant over the long 
term (i.e. a unit elasticity of each revenue item 
with regard to the relevant tax base and a unit 
elasticity of the tax bases to GDP).  
This 'basic' approach has been used in the 
calculations of the indicators and is followed 
(explicitly or implicitly) by a majority of EU 
countries. However, a number of countries 
project revenues in their national long-term 
projections.  
Changes in the revenue ratio up to 2050 may be 
large, in the order of 1-1½% points of GDP. For 
example, in the Netherlands, taxes on pensions 
will increase over the long term since individuals 
have accumulated large assets in funded pension 
schemes and these schemes have not yet 
matured; pension contributions are exempted 
from taxation while disbursements are subject to 
taxation. By contrast, property income as a share 
of GDP might fall over time since, for example, 
returns on bonds (the coupon) are nominally 
fixed and would thus fall in relation to GDP. 
This could have a relatively large impact for 
countries like Finland, with significant assets held 
by the government.  
6.  Overall assessment of the 
sustainability of public finances 
Ensuring fiscal sustainability in view of ageing 
populations is a key challenge in the euro area. 
There is however considerable variation among 
euro-area members both in the scale of the 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area IV/2006 
 
 
 
- 46 - 
challenges that they are facing and whether they 
are mainly related to medium-term or to long-
term budgetary developments. 
Table 16: Overall assessment 
Risk category Country 
Low The Netherlands, Austria and Finland 
Medium Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg 
High Greece and Portugal 
Source: Commission services. 
 
The relative scale of the public finance 
sustainability challenge is represented by three 
categories: low, medium and high risk. While 
clearly distinguishing the size of the challenge 
countries face (see Table 16), this categorisation 
recognises that an ageing population represents a 
budgetary challenge over the long term for all 
countries, since low risk does not mean no risk. 
Overall, two countries are assessed to be at high 
risk, seven at medium risk and three at low risk. 
The high risk countries (EL and PT) are 
characterised by a very significant rise in age-
related expenditure over the long term, which it 
will be necessary to curb. They also have large 
deficits and Greece in particular also already has 
a high debt level. This needs to be tackled 
through budgetary consolidation. 
The medium-risk group of countries (BE, DE, ES, FR, 
IE, IT and LU) is a diverse group consisting of 
countries with very different characteristics. 
Some of these countries currently have relatively 
strong budgetary positions, but face significant 
costs relating to ageing, for which structural 
reform measures are needed. Spain, Ireland and 
Luxembourg fall into this group. Others need to 
consolidate their public finances over the 
medium term, to varying degrees, but are less 
concerned with the cost of ageing, usually 
because they have already reformed their pension 
systems. This is the case in Germany, France and 
Italy. Italy stands out in requiring a rapid 
budgetary consolidation to ensure a steady 
reduction of the currently very high level of debt. 
Belgium’s situation is also distinctive in that it 
needs to maintain a strong budget balance to 
reduce its very high level of debt, as well as 
taking measures to curb the high increase in age-
related expenditure. 
The low risk countries (NL, AT and FI) have come 
furthest in coping with ageing, which implies 
either a strong budgetary position and/or 
comprehensive pension reforms. This does not 
mean that in these countries there are no risks to 
the sustainability of public finances. In Austria, 
the situation depends on the successful 
implementation of the pension reforms enacted. 
The other two countries will also need to 
consider structural reform measures at some 
point to tackle the relatively high projected cost 
of ageing. 
7.  Policy implications 
A broad strategy to ensure fiscal 
sustainability is needed… 
Coping with the budgetary challenge posed by 
ageing populations is a key policy challenge in the 
euro area. The analysis confirms the relevance of 
and need for the three-pronged strategy to 
ensure sustainable public finances, i.e. reducing 
debt at a fast pace, raising employment rates and 
productivity, and reforming pension, health care 
and long-term care systems. 41 
Several euro-area members have made progress 
down these three routes, by resolutely 
implementing often difficult policy choices. They 
have shown that reforms and ambitious fiscal 
policies pay off. However, more needs to be 
done, and done soon: postponing these 
inevitable policy choices will not make them 
easier, but more difficult. 
…consisting of fiscal consolidation… 
First, euro-area members need to consolidate the 
public finances so as to run down public debt 
rapidly before the full impact of ageing unfolds. 
Indeed, the analysis shows that consolidating 
public finances towards the MTOs will 
significantly contribute to alleviating part of the 
long-term budgetary costs of ageing and will 
prevent a rapid rise of the debt/GDP ratio. 
Moreover, sound public finances allow for low 
                                                     
41  Decided by the Stockholm European Council in March 
2001. 
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interest rates and high and stable economic 
growth which would in turn improve the 
sustainability of public finances.  
…measures that increase employment and 
productivity… 
Second, the employment rate needs to be raised 
in the euro area, especially amongst women and 
older workers. It should be noted that 
considerable progress has already been made in 
the euro area, with employment rates having 
increased in recent years and continued increases 
are projected over the long-term as a result of 
enacted structural reforms. The overall 
employment rate in the euro area is projected to 
increase from 63% in 2004 to 67% in 2010 and 
to reach 70% - the Lisbon target - by 2035. 
Nonetheless, if employment rates were to 
increase more than assumed in the common 
long-term projections made by the Commission 
and the Economic Policy Committee42 it would 
considerably contribute to fiscal sustainability. 
Indeed, in many countries, substantial benefits 
could be reaped by reducing structural 
unemployment further. Successfully 
implementing policy measures that increase 
employment and enhance productivity, in line 
with the goals of the Lisbon strategy, would 
furthermore raise potential GDP growth rates, 
improve future living standards and provide 
more room for budgetary reallocation in the 
future.  
In addition, the above-mentioned common long-
term projections show that some limited 
budgetary savings could be achieved by a 
projected reduction in education expenditure on 
account of ageing populations. However, as 
productivity will need to be boosted in the 
future, Member States could consider using those 
savings to modernise their education systems, in 
line with the Lisbon commitments to build a 
knowledge-based economy.  
…and reforms of the welfare models… 
Third, Member States need to consider 
appropriate reforms of pension, health-care and 
long-term care systems to ensure that they are 
financially viable in the face of ageing while at the 
                                                     
42  See footnote 37.  
same time securing core policy goals of adequacy 
and access. Recent pension reforms in several 
euro-area countries have reduced the budgetary 
impact of ageing and are helping to raise the 
effective retirement age.  
In many cases, reforms of public pension 
systems have made them less generous; they 
reduce average public pensions in relation to 
average wages over time. But it is important that 
pensions overall can be maintained at an 
adequate level for reforms to enjoy lasting 
support. This means raising employment rates 
and in particular giving older workers incentives 
to extend their working lives and hence accrue 
more pension benefits. 
Finally, the analysis shows that there is some 
uncertainty as to what the key drivers of public 
health-care expenditure will be. The population 
may continue to demand an increasing share of 
public health-care services, as has been observed 
in the past decades, and there is a distinct 
possibility that demand for higher provision of 
health-care services will put upward pressure on 
public spending as a share of GDP over and 
above that motivated solely by demographic 
change. Coping with the observed trend 
increases in public spending on health care is 
currently under debate in several countries. 
…to improve the functioning of the euro-
area economies 
In addition to rigorously implementing the 
consolidation of the public finances over the 
medium-term towards the MTOs and/or 
maintaining a budgetary position that would 
reduce sustainability risks, a determined effort 
will be required to improve the functioning of 
the euro-area economies and to adapt public 
systems to better enable them to cope with the 
significant challenges ahead. The policies behind 
this three-pronged strategy are an integral part of 
the Lisbon strategy as raising employment rates 
and running sound macro- and micro-economic 
policies are conducive to economic growth and 
prosperity. What combination of policies in these 
three areas is deemed appropriate will depend on 
what form the sustainability challenge takes in 
each euro-area country and what policy priorities 
they have set themselves. 
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http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers255_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 256.  
N. Diez Guardia and K. Pichelmann (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
Labour Migration Patterns in Europe: Recent Trends, Future Challenges 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers256_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 257.  
R. Beetsma (University of Amsterdam) and A. L. Bovenberg (Tilburg University) 
Pension systems, intergenerational risk sharing and inflation 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers257_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 258.  
Gilles Mourre and Michael Thiel (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
Monitoring short-term labour cost developments in the European Union: which indicators to trust? 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers258_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 259.  
Karel Havik and Kieran Mc Morrow (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
Global trade integration and outsourcing: How well is the EU coping with the new challenges? 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers259_en.htm  
3. Regular publications  
Euro area GDP indicator (Indicator-based forecast of quarterly GDP growth in the euro area) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/euroareagdp_en.htm 
Business and Consumer Surveys (harmonised surveys for different sectors of the economies in the European 
Union (EU) and the applicant countries)  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessandconsumersurveys_en.htm 
Business Climate Indicator for the euro area (monthly indicator designed to deliver a clear and early assessment 
of the cyclical situation) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessclimate_en.htm 
Key indicators for the euro area (presents the most relevant economic statistics concerning the euro area)  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/key_euro_area/keyeuroarea_en.htm 
Monthly and quarterly notes on the euro-denominated bond markets (looks at the volumes of debt issued, the 
maturity structures, and the conditions in the market) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/bondmarkets_en.htm 
Price and Cost Competitiveness 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/priceandcostcompetiteveness_en.htm 
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V. Key indicators for the euro area 
 
1 Output 2003 2004 2005 June-06 July-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06
 Industrial confidence 1.1 Balance -11 -5 -8 3 4 2 4 5 6 
 Industrial production 1.2 mom % ch 0.5 2.0 1.3 0.4 -0.5 1.7 -1.0   
  2003 2004 2005 05Q2 05Q3 05Q4 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 
 Gross domestic product 1.3 Qtr. % ch    0.4 0.6 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.5 
2 Private consumption 2003 2004 2005 June-06 July-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06
 Consumer confidence 2.1 Balance -18 -14 -14 -9 -8 -9 -8 -8 -7 
 Retail sales 2.2  mom % ch 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.1 0.4 0.7 -1.0 0.3  
  2003 2004 2005 05Q2 05Q3 05Q4 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 
 Private consumption 2.3 Qtr. % ch 1.3 1.4 1.4 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.6 
3 Investment 2003 2004 2005 05Q2 05Q3 05Q4 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 
 Capacity utilization 3.1 % 80.7 81.6 81.3 81.1 80.9 81.1 82.0 82.5 83.6 
 Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 Qtr. % ch 1.0 2.1 2.7 1.2 1.2 0.6 1.0 2.3 0.8 
 Change in stocks 3.3 % of GDP 0.0 -0.1  0.2 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.2 
4 Labour market 2003 2004 2005 June-06 July-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06
 Unemployment 4.1 % 8.4 8.9 8.5 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.7  
   2003 2004 2005 05Q2 05Q3 05Q4 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 
 Employment 4.2 Ann. % ch 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.3  
 Shortage of labour 4.3 % 2.5 2.4  2.0 2.1 2.8 2.7 3.1 4.3 
 Wages 4.4 Ann. % ch 2.5 2.2  2.2 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.4  
5 International transactions  2003 2004 2005 June-06 July-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06
 Export order books 5.1 Balance -24 -13 -16 3 2 1 2 2 2 
 World trade 5.2 Bn. EUR 132 146 157 172 169 175 178   
 Exports of goods 5.3 Bn. EUR 1056.0 1142.1 1232.5 113.2 111.1 116.2 118.5   
 Imports of goods 5.4 Bn. EUR 970.4 1069.1 1207.3 115.0 117.4 119.5 119.4   
 Trade balance 5.5 Bn. EUR 85.6 73.0 25.2 -1.8 -6.2 -3.3 -0.9   
   2003 2004 2005 05Q2 05Q3 05Q4 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 
 Exports of goods and services 5.6 Qtr. % ch 1.1 6.8 4.2 1.9 2.6 0.7 3.8 1.1 1.7 
 Imports of goods and services 5.7 Qtr. % ch 3.1 6.7 5.2 2.6 2.4 1.6 2.8 1.1 2.1 
   2003 2004 2005 June-06 July-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06
 Current account balance 5.8 Bn. EUR 18.1 42.4 38.8 4.9 -2.1 -3.9 -0.3   
 Direct investment (net) 5.9 Bn. EUR -18.4 -39.7 -41.8 -7.7 -9.4 -7.6 -19.9   
 Portfolio investment (net) 5.10 Bn. EUR -9.4 39.0 32.3 66.5 1.0 -15.0 40.5   
6 Prices  2003 2004 2005 June-06 July-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06
 HICP 6.1 Ann. % ch 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.3 1.7 1.6 1.8 
 Core HICP 6.2 Ann. % ch 2.0 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6  
 Producer prices 6.3 Ann. % ch 1.6 2.3 4.1 5.8 6.0 5.7 4.6 4.0  
 Import prices6.4 Ann. % ch 102.5 97.2 104.8 113.3 114.0 115.1    
7 Monetary and financial indicators  2003 2004 2005 June-06 July-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06
 Interest rate (3 months) 7.1 % p.a. 2.3 2.1 2.2 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.6 
 Bond yield (10 years) 7.2 % p.a. 4.1 4.1 3.4 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.7 
 ECB repo rate 7.3  % p.a. 3.25 2.75  2.75 2.75 3.00 3.25 3.25 3.50 
 Stock markets 7.4  Index 2420 2805 3207 3529 3617 3744 3817 3973 4053 
 M3 7.5 Ann. % ch 7.8 5.9 7.4 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.4   
 Credit to private sector (loans) 7.6 Ann. % ch 5.0 6.0 8.1 11.0 11.1 11.3 11.4 11.2  
 Exchange rate USD/EUR 7.7 Value 1.13 1.24 1.24 1.27 1.27 1.28 1.27 1.26 1.29 
 Nominal effective exchange rate 7.8 Index 106.4 109.8 109.7 112.6 112.7 112.5 112.4 112.0 112.6 
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Number Indicator Note Source 
1 Output   
1.1 Industrial confidence 
indicator  
Industry survey, average of balances to replies on production expectations, 
order books, and stocks (the latter with inverted sign) 
ECFIN 
1.2 Industrial production  Volume, excluding construction, wda Eurostat 
1.3 Gross domestic product  Volume (1995), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
2 Private consumption   
2.1 Consumer confidence 
indicator  
Consumer survey, average of balances to replies on four questions (financial 
and economic situation, unemployment, savings over next 12 months) 
ECFIN 
2.2 Retail sales Volume, excluding motor vehicles, wda Eurostat 
2.3 Private consumption Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3 Investment   
3.1 Capacity utilisation  In percent of full capacity, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, survey data 
(collected in each January, April, July and October). 
ECFIN 
3.2 Gross fixed capital 
formation  
Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3.3 Change in stocks In percent of GDP, volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4 Labour market   
4.1 Unemployment  In percent of total workforce, ILO definition, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4.2 Employment  Number of employees, partially estimated, seasonally adjusted ECB/ 
Eurostat 
4.3 Shortage of labour Percent of firms in the manufacturing sector reporting a shortage of labour 
(unfilled job openings) as a constraint to production, seasonally adjusted  
ECFIN 
4.4 Wages  Not fully harmonised concept, but representative for each Member State 
(mostly hourly earnings) 
ECFIN 
5 International transactions  
5.1 Export order books Industry survey; balance of positive and negative replies, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.2 World trade Volume, 1998=100, seasonally adjusted CPB 
5.3 Exports of goods Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob Eurostat 
5.4 Imports of goods  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, cif Eurostat 
5.5 Trade balance Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob-cif Eurostat 
5.6 Exports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.7 Imports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.8 Current account balance  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions; before 1997 partly 
estimated 
ECB 
5.9 Direct investment   (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
5.10 Portfolio investment  (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
6 Prices   
6.1 HICP  Harmonised index of consumer prices Eurostat 
6.2 Core HICP Harmonised index of consumer prices, excluding energy and unprocessed 
food 
Eurostat 
6.3 Producer prices Without construction Eurostat 
6.4 Import prices Import unit value index for goods  Eurostat 
7 Monetary and financial indicators  
7.1 Interest rate  Percent p.a., 3-month interbank money market rate, period averages Ecowin 
7.2 Bond yield Percent p.a., 10-year government bond yields, lowest level prevailing in the 
euro area, period averages 
Ecowin 
7.3 ECB repo rate Percent p.a., minimum bid rate of the ECB, end of period Ecowin 
7.4 Stock markets  DJ Euro STOXX50 index, period averages Ecowin 
7.5 M3  Seasonally adjusted moving average moving average (3 last months)  ECB 
7.6 Credit to private sector 
(loans) 
MFI loans to euro-area residents excluding MFIs and general government, 
monthly values: month end values, annual values: annual averages 
ECB 
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7.7 Exchange rate USD/EUR  Period averages ECB 
7.8 Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
Against 13 other industrialised countries, double export weighted, 1995 = 
100, increase (decrease): appreciation (depreciation) 
ECFIN 
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